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ARTICLES
NUCLEAR WAR, CITIZEN INTERVENTION, AND
THE NECESSITY DEFENSE*
Robert Aldridge and Virginia Stark**
I. INTRODUCTION
There are exceptions to every rule and the same applies to law.
The Principle of Necessity justifies breaking certain laws when nec-
essary to prevent a greater harm.
The purpose of this article is to follow the evolutionary develop-
ment of the common law Principle of Necessity from early American
history to recent citizen intervention' to prevent the most colossal of
© 1986 by Robert Aldridge and Virginia Stark.
* This article evolved from numerous citizen intervention trials in which the Principle
of Necessity was invoked-sometimes successfully and other times not. Many are cited herein.
To all the defendants in those trials, we extend recognition and credit, and our sincere appreci-
ation. We also wish to thank the many people, both within and outside the legal profession,
who have read and criticized early drafts of this article.
** Robert Aldridge is an aerospace engineer with a nuclear weapons design background
who has been called as an expert witness in numerous citizen intervention trials. He has writ-
ten several articles and books concerning nuclear weapons proliferation. Virginia Stark is a
law student at the University of Santa Clara who is expecting her J.D. in May, 1986. She has
completed extensive research and writing to support citizen intervention cases on habeas corpus
to the California courts of appeal and the California Supreme Court.
1. "Citizen intervention," as it is referred to in this article, has been traditionally and
erroneously termed "civil disobedience" in other forums. The terms, however, are distinct.
Civil disobedience is one form of citizen intervention, but the reverse is not always
true-citizen intervention is not disobedient when it is legally justified by the Principle of
Necessity.
Civil disobedience in its pure form was used during the American colonial period. The
Boston Tea Party is a notorious example. Later, civil disobedience was introduced into South
Africa and then into India by Mahatma Gandhi. In both these examples, the activity involved
the deliberate violation of a law because that particular law was unjust. Gandhi insisted that
this be done in a nonviolent and civil manner; thus the term "civil" disobedience. The focus
was on directly challenging the laws as unjust because they were British laws which oppressed
indigenous people for the benefit of Britian.
A legal definition of Mahatma Gandhi's form of nonviolent civil disobedience is put forth
in Commonwealth v. Capitolo: "Civil disobedience is breaking a law on the ground that it is
immoral; one recognizes, and perhaps expects, that the court may uphold the law, and if that
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all harms imaginable-nuclear war. A history of reported cases pro-
vides ample criteria to either justify or discredit any claim to neces-
sity. However, courts have usually suppressed proof of this criteria
when faced with citizen intervention cases. Nevertheless, a small but
growing practice of allowing juries to hear a necessity defense can be
gleaned from the decisions of non-reported citizen intervention trials.
Furthermore, when such a defense has been put to a jury, the de-
fendant has usually been acquitted. This fact raises the question of
whether courts are really effecting justice by denying a necessity de-
fense or whether the courts are acting upon political motivations.
Finally, this article discusses in detail the elements required to
justify necessity and shows why applying these elements to citizen
intervention aimed at preventing nuclear war is not a frivolous
claim.
occurs, one is willing, perhaps eager, to accept the punishment prescribed by law." Common-
wealth v. Capitolo, 471 A.2d 462, 473 (Pa. 1984), rev'd, Commonwealth v. Capitola, 498
A.2d 806 (Pa. 1985); see infra text accompanying notes 74-76. The Capitolo court quoted
Gandhi's statement to the English judge when Gandhi was convicted of sedition in 1922:
Nonviolence implies voluntary submission to the penalty for noncooperation
with evil. I am here, therefore, to invite and submit cheerfully to the highest
penalty that can be inflicted upon me for what in law is a deliberate crime and
what appears to me to be the highest duty of a citizen. The only course open to
you, the judge, is either to resign your post, and thus disassociate yourself from
evil if you feel that the law you are called upon to administer is an evil and that
in reality I am innocent, or to inflict on me the severest penalty if you believe
that the system and the law you are assisting to administer are good for the
people of this country and that my activity is therefore injurious to the public
weal.
Gandhi, A Plea for the Severest Penalty Upon Conviction of Sedition, March 23, 1922, re-
printed in THE LAW AS LITERATURE 459, 465-66 (E. London ed. 1960).
Citizen intervention because of necessity can also involve breaking an immoral law. This
occurred during the 1940-60 Civil Rights campaign when blacks held lunch counter sit-ins and
refused to move to "the back of the bus." In these cases, however, the action of breaking the
law was legal because a higher law-the United States Constitution-made such discrimina-
tion illegal. These actions involve the necessity to comply with a higher law. The duty to obey
international law as a higher law also falls within this category of necessity.
The final form of citizen intervention is the necessity to prevent a great harm. This article
will address this form of citizen intervention because nuclear war is the most colossal harm
imaginable. It should be clearly recognized however, that when technically criminal acts are
justified by the Principle of Necessity, the acts are not illegal, and the accused "has no need of
forgiveness." Arnolds & Garland, The Defense of Necessity in Criminal Law: The Right to
Choose the Lesser Evil, 65 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 289, 290 (1974). Hence, these acts
should not be referred to as civil disobedience. A group in the state of Washington dedicated to
stopping the nuclear Trident submarine and missile weapons system, the Ground Zero Center
for Nonviolent Action, has decided to use the term "Nuremberg Action" to refer to their citi-
zen interventions to halt the government's criminal acts, rather than the misnomer of civil
disobedience. See also Campbell, The Nuremberg Defense to Charges of Domestic Crime: A
Non-Traditional Approach for Nuclear-Arms Protestors, 16 CAL. WESTERN INT'L L.J. 93
(1986).
NECESSITY DEFENSE
II. COMMON LAW BACKGROUND OF THE NECESSITY DEFENSE
The concept that "one should not be punished when an act of
breaking the law prevents more evil than it has caused"' is an essen-
tial and a basic one in our system of laws. The necessity doctrine
originated in English common law and through time has become a
well established principle in United States criminal law.' Early fed-
eral and state cases were quick to recognize that necessity is a legiti-
mate defense in situations such as shipwrecks, fires and similar
emergencies in which quick decisions and immediate actions are
needed.
One of the earliest cases in United States history regarding the
necessity defense occurred in 1834 and involved a mutiny in which
the crew was justified in disobeying orders because they had a "bo-
nafide reasonable belief" that the ship was unseaworthy.4 Defend-
ants in that case established that "[niot just actual peril but a well
founded belief in impending peril is sufficient to raise the defense. "6
This case established early on that an accused's reasonable belief is
an essential factual consideration.
The trier of fact decides if the elements establishing necessity
are present once the proffered evidence has raised legitimate factual
issues concerning those elements. In the 1810 case of William Gray,6
a ship's owner was charged with violating the Embargo Act. The
owner claimed a storm had forced the captain to put ashore for the
safety of the crew and the cargo. This was probably the first Ameri-
can case to hold that the question of necessity should be decided by a
jury.
In 1846, the Rhode Island Militia successfully argued necessity
for an alleged kidnapping of people who participated in the "Dorr
Rebellion."' This case established that the existence of a state of ne-
cessity is to be determined by a jury as a question of fact: "the jury
and not the State of Rhode Island, was the proper judge [of
necessity. ' ' a
Two other early cases established the jury's role in determining
whether actions meet the elements of necessity. Mitchell v. Harmony
held that whether or not a danger existed or exists is for the jury to
2. U.S. Comm. on Reform of Federal Criminal Laws, Study Draft § 608 (1970).
3. Res Publica v. McCarty, 86 U.S. (2 Dali) (1781).
4. United States v. Ashton, 24 F. Cas. 873, 874 (No. 14,470) (C.C.D. Mass. 1834).
5. Arnolds & Garland, supra note 1, at 294.
6. William Gray, 29 F. Cas. 1300 (No. 17,694) (C.C.D.N.Y. 1810).
7. Commonwealth v. Blodget, 53 Mass. (12 Met.) 56 (1846).
8. Id. at 71.
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decide, and Aldrich v. Wright provided that it is fot" the jury to de-
termine if a danger is imminent.9
In the 1853 California case of Surocco v. Geary,'0 a large fire
threatened the unburned half of the then small town of San Fran-
cisco. A public officer ordered the destruction of houses to create a
firebreak and was subsequently sued by one of the owners. On ap-
peal, the California Supreme Court held that the action was proper
because:
The right to destroy property, to prevent the spread of a confla-
gration, has been traced to the highest law of necessity, and the
natural rights of man, independent of society and the civil gov-
ernment. "It is referred by moralists and jurists as the same
great principle which justifies the exclusive appropriation of a
plank in a shipwreck, though the life of another be sacrificed;
with the throwing overboard goods in a tempest, for the safety
of the vessel; with the trespassing upon the lands of another, to
escape death by an enemy. It rests upon the maxim, Necessitas
inducit privilegium quod jura private." [Necessity leads to
privileges because of private justice].1
The court made a point of addressing who should decide if the
situation constitutes a necessity justifying the destruction of property.
It held that the best policy was to allow each individual to act at his
or her own risk and to be held liable if found to have acted irrespon-
sibly. The California Legislature expanded on the common law in
1872 when it enacted statutes providing for the private right to abate
public and private nuisances."
In 1910, another California case established that when one is in
peril and immediate action is required to escape injury, the reasona-
bleness of the act is a fact to be evaluated by the jury.1 8 Another case
stated that necessity is the quality or state of being necessary which,
in its primary sense, signifies that which makes an act or event una-
9. Mitchell v. Harmony, 54 U.S. (13 How.) 115, 133 (1851); Aldrich v. Wright, 53
N.H. 398, 402-403 (1873).
10. Surocco v. Geary, 3 Cal. 69 (1853).
11. Id. at 73.
12. CAL. CIv. CODE §§ 3495, 3502 (West 1970). Section 3495 reads: "Any person may
abate a public nuisance which is specially injurious to him by removing, or, if necessary,
destroying the thing which constitutes the same, without committing a breach of the peace, or
doing unnecessary injury." Section 3502 reads: "A person injured by a private nuisance may
abate it by removing, or, if necessary, destroying the thing which constitutes the nuisance,
without committing a breach of the peace, or doing unnecessary injury."
13. Hoff v. Los Angeles-Pacific Co., 158 Cal. 596, 112 P. 53 (1910).
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voidable."' Still another early California case defined necessity as
that which is unavoidable, inevitable, or indispensable.1 5
The 1920 Arizona case of State v. Wooten,16 better known as
the Bisbee Deportation, involved social harm. Defendants were
charged with kidnapping when, as part of a posse, they rounded up
members of the Industrial Workers of the World (Wobblies) and
deported them to New Mexico. Posse members claimed they had
substantial belief that the Wobblies were involved in a conspiracy to
strike the local copper mine and incite violence. Defendants were
acquitted by the jury because of necessity, and the court made sev-
eral important points: the distinction between self defense being jus-
tified to repulse a wrong and necessity as justifying the invasion of a
right;17 actions of necessity can be against persons as well as prop-
erty;" the burden of proving the existence of necessity lies with the
defendant; 9 and the right of citizens to act based on necessity is a
natural right that appertains to the individual.2 Finally, the court
cited the 1846 Rhode Island Militia case21 to reestablish that neces-
sity is a fact to be determined by the jury. Wooten is credited as
being the first authoritative discussion of necessity in the United
States.2
III. EVOLUTION OF THE NECESSITY DEFENSE IN THE MODERN
AGE
As the common law has clearly determined, deciding whether
the accused has met the critical elements of a necessity defense are
questions of fact to be decided by the jury. In Morissette v. United
States,23 the United States Supreme Court pointed out that the case
would have been insignificant had the trial not been conducted in
such a manner and the facts presented to the jury in such a way as
to raise fundamental and far reaching questions in criminal law.
The case was granted certiorari solely because essential questions of
fact, such as the reasonableness of defendant's act, were excluded
14. Spreckles v. City & County of San Francisco, 76 Cal. App. 267, 244 P. 919 (1926).
15. Wheeler v. Barker, 92 Cal. App. 2d 776, 208 P.2d 68, 73 (1949).
16. Pattee, State v. Wooten, 6 A.B.A. J. 99 (1920).
17. The Law of Necessity as Applied to the Bisbee Deportation, 3 ARIZ. L. REV. 264,
266-67 n.50 (1961).
18. d.
19. Id. at 268.
20. Arnolds & Garland, supra note 1, at 293.
21. Commonwealth v. Blodget, 53 Mass. (12 Met.) 56, 71 (1846).
22. For a fuller discussion of Wooten, see Arnolds & Garland, supra note 1, at 292-94.
23. 342 U.S. 246 (1952).
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from the jury during trial.
The Morissette opinion specifically addressed the important
function of the jury:
Jurors may be perverse, the ends of justice may be defeated by
unrighteous verdicts; but so long as the function of judge and
jury are distinct, the one responding to the law, the other to
facts, neither can invade the province of the other without de-
stroying the significance of trial by court and jury . . . It fol-
lows that the trial court may not withdraw or prejudge the issue
24
"It is better to be allowed a defense of uncertain ambit than
none at all."'2' Even when a doubt may exist in the judge's mind,
there is no miscarriage of justice in submitting the issue to the jury.
As commentators Arnolds and Garland eloquently point out:
When activity falls within the "penumbra" of law or when dis-
agreement exists within a society about a moral issue or the
extent to which a value is absolute (admitting to no exceptions)
or relative, there seems to be little reason why a defendant
should not be allowed in the first instance to have the jury as
the "conscience of the community" and his peers decide whether
he made an objectively correct choice of value . . . When the
defendant raises a good faith defense of necessity, that is, makes
a non-frivolous claim that his otherwise criminal act was done
to preserve some higher value, the jury as representative of the
community should be allowed to decide the issue of relative val-
ues .... 26
This principle is the rule in California and the Ninth Circuit.
"[D]oubts as to the sufficiency of the evidence to warrant instructions
should be resolved in favor of the accused.'2 A trial court should
only make findings adverse to a proffered defense which are sup-
ported by the record if the case is tried by the judge without a jury. 6
In a jury trial, "[a] defendant has the right to have a jury resolve the
disputed factual issues." ' 9
Regarding the issue of who determines whether the alleged
harm is greater than the action seeking to stop it, commentator
Glanville Williams points out that "although the defense of necessity
24. Id. at 274.
25. MODEL PENAL CODE § 3.02, comment, at 17 (1985).
26. Arnolds & Garland, supra note 1, at 296.
27. People v. Flannel, 25 Cal. 3d 668, 685, 603 P.2d 1, 160 Cal. Rptr. 84 (1979).
28. United States v. Contento-Pachon, 723 F.2d 691, 695-96, n.2 (9th Cir. 1984).
29. Id. at 696; see Sandstrom v. Montana, 442 U.S. 510, 523 (1974).
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is subjective as to its facts, it is objective as to its values . ..[and]
involves deciding whether, on the social view, the value asserted was
greater than the value denied." 0 Because such a social value does
exist, the reasonableness of a claim of necessity is left to the jury as a
matter of fact, rather than to the judge as a matter of law.
The Principle of Necessity has been included in twenty-two
state criminal codes.3" Others recognize it by decisional law and/or
rely on common law, or take judicial notice of a sister state's statu-
tory and decisional laws.3"
A 1974 jailbreak case was a milestone in the evolution of the
common law Principle of Necessity through decisional law. In Peo-
ple v. Lovercamp,33 the court of appeal held that by allowing the
assertion of the necessity defense, it had not "formulated a new rule
but rather ha[d] applied rules long ago established in a manner
which effects fundamental justice." 3' The court stated that it was not
creating a new defense for escape, "[w]e merely recognize, as did an
English court 238 years ago, that some conditions 'excuseth the fel-
ony.' ,,85 Moreover, the court of appeal made clear in Lovercamp
that whether or not the elements raised in the defense were sufficient
was a "question of fact to be decided by the trier of fact [the jury]
30. G. WILLIAMS, THE CRIMINAL LAW § 239 (2d ed. 1961).
31. See MODEl. PENAL CODE § 3.02, comment (1985).
32. E.g., CAL. EVID. CODE § 452(a) (West 1966): "Judicial notice may be taken of the
following matters to the extent that they are not embraced in Section 451: (a) The decisional,
constitutional and statutory law of any state of the United States ...."
Section 453 adds that "Itihe trial court shall take judicial notice of any matter specified in
Section 452 if a party requests it ....
33. People v. Lovercamp, 43 Cal. App. 3d 823, 118 Cal. Rptr. 110 (1974); see also M.
Gardner, The Defense of Necessity and the Right to Escape Prison: A Step Towards Incarcer-
ation Freefrom Sexual Assault, 49 S. CAL. L. REV. 110 (1975).
34. Lovercamp, 43 Cal. App. 3d at 827, 118 Cal. Rptr. at 112. Additional text from the
court's opinion follows:
In a humane society some attention must be given to the individual dilemma. In
doing so the court must use extreme caution lest the overriding interest of the
public be overlooked. The question that must be resolved involves looking at all
the choices available to the defendant and then determining whether the act of
escape was the only viable and reasonable choice available. By doing so, both
the public interest and the individual's interest may adequately be protected. In
our ultimate conclusion it will be seen that we have adopted a position which
gives reasonable consideration to both interests. While we conclude that under
certain circumstances a defense of necessity may be proven by the defendant, at
the same time we place rigid limitations on the viability of the defense in order
to insure that the rights and interests of society will not be impinged upon. We
have not formulated a new rule of law but rather have applied rules long ago
established in a manner which effects fundamental justice.
Id.
35. Id. at 834, 118 Cal. Rptr. at 116.
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after taking into consideration all the surrounding circumstances. '""6
Lovercamp has established a precedent that affects other areas. As
Frank D. Berry wrote, "if society is prepared to forgive a felony
escape under emergency circumstances, a fortiori it must be prepared
to forgive a misdemeanor."' 87 The elements formulated by the Cali-
fornia court of appeal establishing necessity to escape from jail are
the following:
(1) The prisoner is faced with a specific threat of death, forcible
sexual attack, or substantial bodily injury in the immediate
future;
(2) There is no time for a complaint to the authorities or there
exists a history of futile complaints which make any results
from such a complaint illusory;
(3) There is neither time nor opportunity to resort to courts;
(4) There is no evidence of force or violence used toward prison
personnel or other "innocent" persons in the escape; and
(5) The prisoner immediately reports to the proper authorities
when he or she has attained a position of safety from the imme-
diate threat."
In a later case, People v. Condley,3 the court of appeal empha-
sized that the threatened danger need not be imminent:
The necessity in Lovercamp is not like the classical paradigm of
absolute necessity where the prisoner escapes to save his life
from immediate danger of a prison fire. [citations omitted] Ab-
solute and imminent necessity are rare, and even rarer is prose-
cution under such circumstances. [citations omitted] Unlike du-
ress, under Lovercamp the threat is in the "immediate future"
... .Duress requires an imminent threat to one's life."0
"Imminence" of the feared harm, particularly in the modern
age, is an element which requires interpretation. There is no known
statutory definition of "imminence," but generally accepted defini-
tions of words and phrases are used to guide the jury. However,
neither lay nor legal definitions measure imminence in seconds or
minutes, or even in weeks or months.' 1 For that reason an adequate
36. Id. at 832, 118 Cal. Rptr. at 116.
37. F. Berry, Jr., The Mysterious Defense of Necessity, 54 CAL. ST. B.J. 384, 387
(1979).
38. Lovercamp, 43 Cal. App. 3d at 831-32, 118 Cal. Rptr. at 115; see also, United
States v. Michelson, 559 F.2d 567, 568 (9th Cir. 1977), United States v. Baily, 585 F.2d 1087
(D.C. Cir. 1978).
39. 69 Cal. App. 3d 999, 138 Cal. Rptr. 515 (1977).
40. Id. at 1012, 138 Cal. Rptr. at 522.
41. See, e.g., WEBSTER'S THIRD INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LAN-
[Vol. 26
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jury instruction would include the charge that all the surrounding
circumstances must be considered and viewed in light of the factual
situation of the particular case. The concept of imminence is subjec-
tive as to what must actually happen to prevent the harm, and the
time required to prevent the harm. Citizen intervention actions, as
we shall see below, often require a completely different dimension of
time than do cases of absolute necessity and duress.
People v. Harmon also addressed the question of imminency.
The court ruled that "imminency is . . . to be decided by the [jury]
taking into consideration all the surrounding circumstances, includ-
ing defendant's opportunity and ability to avoid the feared harm.'"42
Other cases have further developed and substantiated the criteria of
necessity to escape from jail, and that the elements of necessity are to
be decided by the jury."' Of note in these cases is that imminency is
established in relation to the surrounding circumstances and that re-
lationship is a fact to be decided by the jury. The Model Penal Code
also does not require that the evil to be avoided be imminent.4 ' "[Ilt
is a mistake to erect imminence as an absolute requirement, since
there may be situations in which an otherwise illegal act is necessary
to avoid an evil that may occur in the future." '
The Los Angeles County case of People v. Pena" addressed the
Principle of Necessity under the concept of duress and established
that it is applicable to situations in which the threatened harm is to
persons other than the defendant.4 The Pena court also held that,
upon raising the issue of necessity, the defense is available to all
crimes except taking the life of an innocent person. 8
The Pena court then outlined six requisite elements for a neces-
sity defense:
(1) the act charged as criminal must have been done to prevent
a significant evil;
GUAGE (unabridged) which defines "imminent" as follows: "1: ready to take place; near at
hand; that is about to occur; hanging threateningly over one's head; menacingly near; 2: IM-
MANENT." See also BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 676 (5th ed. 1979) which defines "immi-
nent" as follows: "Near at hand; mediate rather than immediate; close rather than touching;
impending; on the point of happening; threatening; menacing; perilous."
42. People v. Harmon, 53 Mich. 482, 220 N.W.2d 212, 214 (1974).
43. People v. Unger, 66 Ill. 2d 333, 362 N.E.2d 319 (1977); People v. Martin, 100
Mich. App. 447, 298 N.W.2d 900 (1980).
44. MODEL PENAL CODE § 3.02, comment, at 16 (1985).
45. Id. at 17.
46. 149 Cal. App. 3d Supp. 14, 197 Cal. Rptr. 264 (1983).
47. Id. at 23-25, 197 Cal. Rptr. at 269-70.
48. Id. at 22-23, 197 Cal. Rptr. at 268-69.
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(2) there must have been no adequate alternative to the commis-
sion of the act;
(3) the harm caused by the act must not be disproportionate to
the harm avoided;
(4) the accused must entertain a good-faith belief that his/her
act was necessary to prevent the greater harm;
(5) such belief must be objectively reasonable under all the cir-
cumstances; and,
(6) the accused must not have substantially contributed to the
creation of the emergency.
4
"
Citizen intervention to save numerous lives is but the latest
common law evolution of the Principle of Necessity. The anti-Viet-
nam War movement of the 1960s and early 1970s provided numer-
ous cases in which defendants tried to assert the defense of necessity
to justify their acts of citizen intervention. 0 These cases spawned
much language about three essential points of the defense: the ques-
tion of the existence of a greater harm; the question of relative val-
ues; and, the connection between defendant's action and the preven-
tion of harm. The Ninth Circuit case of United States v. Simpson 1
addressed the latter, albeit causally. On Christmas Eve 1970, Simp-
son burned selective service (draft) records in San Jose, California to
protest the war in Vietnam. He claimed he was seeking to stop the
killing. The court recognized the validity of the necessity defense be-
cause Simpson had apparently shown that the Vietnam War was a
"public disaster." But the court did not agree that Simpson had es-
tablished that his act was instrumental in alleviating that disaster.
The decision states: "An essential element of the so-called justifica-
tion defense is that a direct causal relationship be reasonably antici-
pated to exist between defendant's action and the avoidance of
harm.""2
49. Id. at 25-26, 197 Cal. Rptr. at 271.
50. United States v. Berrigan, 283 F. Supp. 336 (D. Md. 1969); United States v. Moy-
lan, 417 F.2d 1002 (4th Cir. 1969); United States v. Cullen, 454 F.2d 386 (7th Cir. 1971);
United States v. Turchick, 452 F.2d 333 (8th Cir. 1971); United States v. Beneke, 449 F.2d
1259 (8th Cir. 1971); United States v. Chase, 468 F.2d 141 (7th Cir. 1972); United States v.
Glick, 463 F.2d 491 (2d Cir. 1972); United States v. Simpson, 460 F.2d 515 (9th Cir. 1972);
United States v. Kroncke, 459 F.2d 697 (8th Cir. 1972); United States v. Daugherty, 474 F.2d
1113 (D.C. Cir. 1973); State v. Marley, 54 Hawaii 450, 509 P.2d 1095 (1973).
51. United States v. Simpson, 460 F.2d 515 (9th Cir. 1972).
52. Id. at 518; see also, Arnolds & Garland, supra note 1, at 300, n.127, which com-
ments on the findings of the court:
Presumably Simpson offered to prove it was reasonable for him to believe these
actions would have a significant effect. The Court of Appeals may have con-
cluded from the record that no reasonable jury could make such a finding. But it
[Vol. 26
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Another Vietnam War intervention case which took place in
Hawaii, State v. Marley,5" was helpful in further defining the ele-
ments of necessity. On May 14, 1971, eight citizens entered the
Honolulu office of Honeywell Corporation and read a statement out-
lining Honeywell's involvement in the Indochina War. Defendants
hung pictures on the office walls and engaged in singing and talking
among themselves. Although considered disruptive to normal busi-
ness, these activities were completely nonviolent. After about three
hours the citizens were ordered to leave or they would be charged
with trespass. They chose to remain and were arrested.
At trial much evidence was introduced about Honeywell's con-
nection with the war. Defendants contended that they were justified
in their trespass because Honeywell manufactured anti-personnel
weapons which were being used to kill innocent people in Indochina.
Although the weapons were not manufactured directly at the Hono-
lulu office, it was undisputed that Honeywell Corporation was a ma-
jor Defense Department contractor of those weapons. Expert testi-
mony for the defense, several exhibits, and many jury instructions
were refused by the court. Defendants were convicted.
On appeal, the court outlined the elements of necessity to stop a
greater harm.5 It stated that 1) the harm to be prevented must ex-
ceed the harm caused by defendants' breach of the law, 2) there be
no legal alternative available, 3) the harm to be prevented is immi-
nent, and 4) a causal relationship be reasonably anticipated to exist
between defendant's act and avoiding the harm.
is hardly clear that when respected persons in the community destroy records to
protest a war these actions have no significant effect on the war policy of the
country. Daniel Ellsberg's releasing of the Pentagon Papers arguably, at least,
had a significant effect on the war.
Id.
53. 54 Hawaii 450, 509 P.2d 1095 (1973).
54. Id. at 1098. The appeal court's opinion on the required elements to justify a neces-
sity defense to avoid a greater harm are presented in items 12 and 13 of that opinion and read
as follows:
12. The "necessity" defense exonerates persons who commit a crime under
pressure of circumstances if the harm that would have resulted from compliance
with the law would have significantly exceeded the harm actually resulting from
the defendant's breach of the law.
13. Successful use of the "necessity defense" requires (a) that there be no third
or legal alternative available, (b) that the harm to be prevented is imminent, and
(c) that a direct causal relationship be reasonably anticipated to exist between
defendant's action and the avoidance of harm.
19861
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IV. THE PRINCIPLE OF NECESSITY IN THE NUCLEAR AGE
The nuclear age has prompted further evolution of the Princi-
ple of Necessity, as a common law principle.
The common law does not consist of absolute, fixed, and inflexi-
ble rules, but rather of broad and comprehensive principles
based on justice, reason, and common sense. It is of judicial ori-
gin and promulgation. Its principles have been determined by
the social needs of the community and have changed with
changes in such needs. These principles are susceptible of adap-
tation to new conditions, interests, relations, and usages as the
progress of society may require.5
The nuclear chain-from nuclear power plants that produce an
essential part of the fuel for nuclear bombs, to the continued produc-
tion of these weapons of mass destruction-is perceived to be threat-
ening everyone, everywhere. Citizens are intervening to dismantle
and abolish this threatening self-extinction chain in order to save
lives, and will obviously continue to intervene as long as a group of
policy-makers continues threatening to actually use these bombs to
annihilate whole countries and, no doubt, everyone; in other words,
nuclear genocide and nuclear ecocide.
A. The Harm of Nuclear Power Plants
Probably the first organized large-scale citizen intervention to
prevent a grave harm which meaningfully asserted the necessity de-
fense in the nuclear age has involved resisting the harm of nuclear
power. An Oregon case which was well-publicized at the time is sig-
nificant.56 Faced with the futility of legal remedies and aware of the
continuing harm emanating from the Trojan nuclear power plant,
the Trojan Decommissioning Alliance acted to try to save lives by
attempting on August 6, 1977 to shut down the plant. Several hun-
dred supporters watched from the Visitors' Information Center as
eighty-two people assumed positions in front of the plant's three
gates and were prepared to stay as long as was necessary to termi-
nate the plant's operation. Two days later, the plant manager or-
dered them to leave under threat of arrest. They refused, were ar-
rested, and were charged with criminal trespass in the second degree.
Oregon is one of the states which has codified many elements of
55. Miller v. Monsen, 37 N.W.2d 543, 545 (Minn. 1949).
56. State v. Mouer, No. 77-246 through 77-324 (Columbia Co. Dist. Ct., Dec. 12-16,
1977).
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common law regarding necessity."7 Oregon Revised Statute section
161.200, Choice of Evils, provides that conduct which would other-
wise constitute an offense is justifiable if it is necessary to avoid an
imminent public or private injury, provided that the threatened in-
jury is greater than the injury caused by the action to prevent it.58
At trial, defendants raised the choice of evils defense and, after
five hours of deliberation, were acquitted by the jury. One jury
member later told the defense lawyer that had the judge allowed
them to consider the expert testimony presented, they would have
only deliberated five minutes, instead of five hours, to reach the "not
guilty" verdict.5" This is believed to be the first nuclear power plant
citizen intervention case in which a necessity defense was successfully
asserted.
Illinois also has codified the requirements of an affirmative de-
fense of necessity. Illinois Revised Statutes state that conduct other-
wise offensive is justified by reason of necessity, providing that the
accused is blameless in causing the situation and reasonably believes
such conduct is necessary to avoid a greater public or private in-
jury.60 This statute introduces the requirement that the accused must
not be responsible for the situation and reaffirms the concepts of
57. OR. REV. STAT. § 161.200 (1971) was derived from MODEL PENAL CODE art. 3, §
3.02, Draft 8; N.Y. REV. PENAL LAW § 25.05; and MICH. REV. CRIM. CODE § 4-605.
58. OR. REV. STAT. § 161.200 (1971), Choice of Evils, reads:
(1) Unless inconsistent with other provisions of Chapter 743, Oregon Laws
1971, defining justifiable use of force, or with some other provision of the law,
conduct which would otherwise constitute an offense is justifiable and not crimi-
nal when:
(a) That conduct is necessary as an emergency measure to avoid an imminent
public and private injury; and
(b) The threatened injury is of such a gravity that, according to ordinary stan-
dards of intelligence and morality, the desirability and urgency of avoiding the
injury clearly outweigh the desirability of avoiding the injury sought to be pre-
vented by the statute defining the offense in issue.
(2) The necessity and justifiability of conduct under subsection (1) of this section
shall not rest upon considerations pertaining only to the morality and advisabil-
ity of the statute, either in its general application or with respect to its applica-
tion to a particular class of case arising thereunder.
Id.
59. Letter from Betty Stein, one of the attorneys in this case, to Robert Aldridge (un-
dated May, 1978).
60. ILL. REV. STAT., ch. 38, § 7-13 (1962). The complete text reads:
Conduct which would otherwise be an offense is justifiable by reason of neces-
sity if the accused was without blame in occasioning or developing the situation
and reasonably believed such conduct was necessary to avoid a public or private
injury greater than the injury which might reasonably result from his own
conduct. $
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"reasonable belief" and "relative harm."
An Illinois court heard what is believed to be the second case in
which a necessity defense was successfully asserted."' Twenty citi-
zens were arrested when they trespassed on Zion nuclear power
plant property during October 1978. They claimed the Zion plant
had been built and operated in such a manner as to pose a multi-
faceted threat to the surrounding Illinois and Wisconsin communi-
ties. The defense argued that it was necessary for defendants to tres-
pass in order to prevent greater evils. After a six-day trial the jury
brought in a verdict of "not guilty." The jury chairman said after-
wards that the trial convinced him that nuclear power plants are "an
imminent and immediate danger."'
California has also provided necessity defense case precedents
applicable to citizens who intervene to save lives threatened by nu-
clear power plant harms. The Rancho Seco facility near Sacramento
was the site of one such attempt on March 31, 1979-only a few
days following the catastrophe at an identical plant on Pennsylva-
nia's Three Mile Island. Two hundred and fifty people picketed
while thirteen climbed the fence and sat inside. Their action was
completely nonviolent. The thirteen were arrested for trespassing
and eleven of them went to trial that same year.68
The defendants' points and authorities memorandum support-
ing their claim to necessity invoked United States and sister state
laws as well as California cases. They also cited California statutes
which have codified the common law right of a person to abate a
public or private nuisance"-a public nuisance being defined as one
which affects at the same time an entire community or neighbor-
hood, or any considerable number of persons, although the extent of
the annoyance or damage inflicted upon individuals may be differ-
ent.6 A private nuisance is every nuisance not included under the
definition of a public nuisance. 6
At trial, the defendants argued that the Rancho Seco plant is a
public nuisance and that evidence should be allowed to show the ne-
cessity of defendants' trespass. The defense drew on People v. Over-
61. People v. Brown, No. 78CM2520 through 78CM2540 (Lake Cty., January 1979).
62. Chicago Sun-Times, Jan. 31, 1979.
63. People v. Block, et al. (Gait Judicial Dist., Sacramento Co. Muni. Ct., Aug. 14,
1979).
64. See CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 3495, 3502 (reprinted supra note 12).
65. CAL. CIV. CODE § 3480 (West 1983).
66. CAL. CIv. CODE § 3481 (West 1983).
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acher67 as a precedent. In that case, a rancher was charged with
shooting and killing a neighbor, and he pleaded self-defense. He con-
tended that the neighbor had constructed a dam which was backing
up water on his land. He had gone to the neighbor's land to remove
the dam with a shovel, arguing that the dam was a nuisance and that
he had a right to be there to abate that nuisance. The shooting oc-
curred when the neighbor approached him.
Overacher wanted to present evidence on the nuisance issue to
show that his trespass was justified and that his neighbor was the
aggressor, but the trial court excluded such testimony. The court of
appeal disagreed. "The defendant, in his effort to show that he acted
in self defense, was entitled to have the whole situation, as it tended
to furnish a reason for his act in going upon the land .. .or his
right to do so, shown to the jury." 8
The Rancho Seco defendants also drew upon the California Su-
preme Court decision in People v. Roberts9 to support their claim of
necessity. In Roberts, police officers approached an apartment when
they heard what they thought were "several moans and groans that
sounded as if a person was in distress."7 The officers had the apart-
ment manager let them in at which time they saw contraband that
was later admitted as evidence against the defendant. Later, it was
discovered that the moaning sound was only the "cooing" of pigeons.
Roberts claimed that the contraband should be excluded from
evidence because the police committed a trespass in order to seize it.
But the California Supreme Court ruled that "[niecessity often justi-
fies an action which would otherwise constitute a trespass, as where
the act is prompted by the motive of preserving life or property and
reasonably appears to the actor to be necessary for that purpose.
71
The court cited traditional civil trespass case law in support of this
proposition . Roberts not only set forth the proposition that neces-
sity can excuse a trespass, it further affirmed that it is what "reason-
ably appears to the actor to be necessary" that is crucial to the neces-
sity defense.
The judge allowed the necessity defense in the Rancho Seco
trespass case and instructed the jury that commission of a crime be-
67. 15 Cal. App. 620, 115 P. 756 (1911).
68. Id. at 627.
69. 47 Cal. 2d 374, 303 P.2d 721 (1956).
70. Id. at 376.
71. Id. at 377.
72. See Ploof v. Putnam, 81 Vt. 471, 71 A. 188, 189 (1908), Metallic Compression
Casting Co. v. Fitchburg, 109 Mass. 277, 280-81 (1872).
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cause of necessity is justifiable and not unlawful. The judge further
ruled that to prove necessity, the defense must show that the demon-
strators were motivated by the desire to protect life and property,
that the defendants believed their actions were necessary to alleviate
the threatened danger, that a reasonable person under similar cir-
cumstances would also believe the actions were necessary, and that
the danger to life and property was substantial and likely to occur in
the immediate future. Expert testimony was admitted during the
trial as to the history and danger surrounding the Rancho Seco
plant.
After seven weeks of trial, nine of the defendants received a split
jury verdict and one was acquitted, apparently because he had a long
history of activism and had convinced the jury that he had exhausted
all legal means to stop the harm threatened by the nuclear power
plant. The eleventh defendant was found guilty because he did not
testify in his own defense. The case against those with a split jury
was eventually dropped.
After the trial, the jury forewoman said: "The majority of us
had no trouble deciding that, yes, the danger was substantial and in
the future." But, she said, "Our problem was that in most cases we
were just not ready to accept the act of civil disobedience . . . .
This is a case in which the use of the common misnomer apparently
worked against the defendants because of its connotation. "Civil dis-
obedience," improperly used as in this case, can prejudice the jury.
Had the term "citizen intervention" been used, it might have created
a courtroom atmosphere more favorable to the defendants.
Another intervention to prevent a grave harm, which occurred
shortly after the Three Mile Island incident, took place at the Ship-
pingport Nuclear Power Plant in Pennsylvania. 4 On July 15, 1979,
citizens ignored "No Trespassing" signs, crept under the fence and
sat down ten to twelve feet inside. They refused to leave when asked
to by security guards and deputy sheriffs, and were subsequently
arrested.
Defending themselves at trial, the citizens relied on section 503
of the Pennsylvania Crimes Code in their offer of proof.7 A neces-
73. East Bay Gazette, Mid-Aug. 1979, at 1, col. 4.
74. Commonwealth v. Capitolo, 471 A.2d at 473.
75. 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 503 (Purdon 1983) provides:
(a) General Rule - Conduct which the actor believes to be necessary to avoid a
harm or evil to himself or to another is justifiable if:
(1) The harm or evil sought to be avoided by such conduct is greater than
that sought to be prevented by the law defining the offense charged;
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sity defense was denied and defendants were convicted. The case was
appealed and the conviction was overturned. In its opinion, the court
held that:
[Plerhaps appellants would not have been able to prove justifi-
cation anyway. The jury might have rejected their experts' testi-
mony, and might have interpreted the documentary evidence
differently than appellants do. But appellants were entitled to
have the jury hear their evidence . . . . The values asserted by
appellants were in no sense either frivolous or bizarre. If the
jury had heard, and accepted, their evidence, it might have
found justification . . . . It was therefore error for the trial
court to reject appellants' offer of proof, thereby precluding
them from proving justification. 6
In subsequent trials involving citizen intervention at nuclear
power plants, the necessity defense has sometimes been successfully
asserted, 7 and at other times the court has refused the jury instruc-
tion on necessity.
When proffering an affirmative defense, it is unconstitutional to
(2) Neither this title nor other law defining the offense provides exceptions
or defenses dealing with the specific situation involved; and
(3) A legislative purpose to exclude the justification claimed does not other-
wise plainly appear.
(b) Choice of evils - When the actor was reckless or negligent in bringing
about the situation requiring a choice of harms or evils or in appraising the
necessity for his conduct, the justification afforded by this section is unavailable
in a prosecution for any offense for which recklessness or negligence, as the case
may be, suffices to establish culpability.
Id.
Section 501 of this code defines "believes" as meaning "reasonably believes." 18 PA.
CONS. STAT. ANN. § 501 (Purdon 1983).
76. Commonwealth v. Capitolo, 471 A.2d at 468. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court
disagreed with the appeals court, holding that the accused were not entitled to have the jury
hear their evidence on the necessity defense. The proffered evidence first has to "pass muster
with the trial judge" before the jury would be allowed to appraise the accused's evidence.
Commonwealth v. Capitolo, 498 A.2d at 810. The court refused expert testimony on the grave
harm of radioactivity emanating from the plant, but nonetheless concluded there was no "real
emergency" and the so-called danger was uncertain and mere speculation. Its justification for
withholding from the jury the expert testimony and the necessity defense that went to the heart
of the issue was that resources had to be conserved so as not to "burden the jury." Id. at 809.
This ruling represents a prime example of a trial court withdrawing or prejudging the issue,
which is the result the U.S. Supreme Court warned against in Morissette v. United States, 342
U.S. 246 (1952).
77. Other known cases are: 1) an intervention by 50 citizens at the Commanche Peak
nuclear powerplant at Glen Rose, Texas, which resulted in a split jury; and 2) at least two
trials with acquittals for citizen intervention at the Duane Arnold nuclear power plant in
Iowa.
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have a different standard of proof for issues of justification.7 8 But a
court typically requires a much stricter offer of proof than it does for
other affirmative defenses when it mischaracterizes citizen interven-
tion as a "protest" of official government "policy," rather than what
it actually is-an attempt to prevent grave harm or loss of life. This
impossible standard was required, for example, in United States v.
Seward.7" Not only did the harm to be prevented have to be criminal
under the law and had to have occurred in the defendant's presence,
but there had to be "a showing that a reasonable man would think
that blocking entry to Rocky Flats for one day would terminate the
official policy of the U.S. Government as to nuclear weapons or nu-
clear power." 80 Federal courts are often more hostile than state
courts when an accused is offering relevant evidence relating to gov-
ernment policy and is opposing a harm that has been officially sanc-
tioned. This is true even when the threatened harm being opposed is
the most colossal harm imaginable-nuclear genocide and ecocide.
B. Preventing Nuclear War and Further Nuclear Weapons
Proliferation
A defense of necessity has also been asserted in trials involving
citizen intervention to stop the harm of nuclear weapons prolifera-
tion. One of the first of these cases took place in California.
1. People v. Aldridge'
On March 1, 1979, the twenty-fifth anniversary of the Bikini
hydrogen bomb test which contaminated Marshallese Islanders and
Japanese fishermen, more than 200 people assembled to prevent a
grave harm at Lockheed's "Naval Industrial Reserve Ordnance
Plant" in Sunnyvale, California. The Trident missile program is
managed from this facility, and it is here that much of the design
work and manufacturing is done. Many citizens carried the 560-foot
long "Trident Monster"-a bamboo pole and rope replica of the
Trident submarine on which hung 408 black flags, one flag for each
of the hydrogen bombs the vessel could carry.
Twenty-eight people carried a portion of the "monster" onto
Navy property managed by Lockheed and were arrested. At trial
78. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 3.01, comment, at 7 (1985).
79. 687 F.2d 1270 (10th Cir. 1982).
80. Id. at 1273.
81. No. 49091 (Sunnyvale-Cupertino Judicial District, Santa Clara Co. Muni. Ct.,
May 21-23, 1979).
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they were allowed a necessity defense. Defendants testified to their
beliefs that Trident missiles were aggressive weapons which made
nuclear war imminent, but no expert witnesses were called to estab-
lish that those beliefs were reasonable. The judge then read the fol-
lowing three instructions to the jury:
Conduct which would otherwise be an offense is justifiable
by reason of necessity if the accused was without blame in occa-
sioning or developing the situation and reasonably believed such
conduct was necessary to protect persons or property from seri-
ous harm.
a8
Defendants have presented, as part of their defense, a Ne-
cessity Defense - that is, defending the lawfulness of their
presence on the property in question under the principle of ne-
cessity. The following guidelines may be used as criteria for de-
termining a case of necessity:
(1) An act or event is occurring, or about to occur, in the pres-
ence of the defendants and is connected with the place of the
defendants' offense;
(2) The harm to be prevented is significantly greater than the
harm resulting from defendants' trespass;
(3) All other forms of noncriminal and less offensive actions to
prevent the act or event have been previously exhausted by the
defendants;
(4) The act or event to be prevented is imminent; and,
(5) A direct causal relation must be reasonably anticipated to
exist between defendants' actions and the avoidance of harm.
All of the above elements must be proved to establish the
defense.
Certain of the defendants have given testimony on the vari-
ous elements needed to justify the principle of necessity. If you
find that collective testimony adequate to justify such a defense
you are to apply it to all defendants even though each defendant
did not testify on each element or possibly none of the
elements. 88
2. Commonwealth v. Berrigan"
Another case is Commonwealth v. Berrigan, the so-called
82. This is an example in which, upon defendant's request, the court took judicial notice
of ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 38, § 7-3.
83. People v. Aldridge, No. 49091, "Partial Transcript on Appeal."
84. 472 A.2d 1099 (Pa. 1984). The Pennsylvania Supreme Court overruled this deci-
sion, Commonwealth v. Berrigan, J-156-84, Nov. 1985, but procedural errors remain to be
resolved. At the time of this writing, defendants are considering petitioning the U.S. Supreme
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"Plowshare-8" trial.88 Early in the morning of September 9, 1981,
the eight defendants entered the General Electric Reentry Systems
plant at King of Prussia, Pennsylvania, where nuclear warhead
shells were being manufactured. They carried blacksmith hammers
and beat on the shells in a symbolic gesture of forging them into
plowshares. They were arrested and charged with burglary, criminal
mischief and criminal conspiracy.
At trial, defendants did not deny their actions, but sought to
defend themselves according to Pennsylvania justification statutes
sections 501, 503 and 510.86 They were allowed to present character
witnesses and testify to their own motivations, but expert testimony
to support elements of the necessity defense was excluded and the
jury found all eight guilty.
On appeal, the appellate court reversed the conviction for sev-
eral reasons, including the following: "The lower court erred when it
ruled that appellants could not introduce the evidence that they
needed to show the objective reasonableness of their action."8 7 The
majority opinion disagreed with the dissent:
[The dissent] seems to say that to avail themselves of the defense
appellants must be able to show that their actions could totally
avert nuclear war; we will not hold them to such a burden. Ap-
pellants must show that their actions could reasonably have
been thought necessary to avert a public disaster .... Surely
the use of the weapons, the components of which were damaged
by appellants, would cause a public disaster on the order of a
"conflagration, flood, earthquake or pestilence.""
In a concurring opinion Judge Spaeth added:
[W]henever a defendant pleads justification, the court should
Court for a writ of certiorari.
85. This was the first in a series of more frequently occurring "Plowshares" actions
symbolizing the biblical imperative to beat swords into plowshares and spears into pruning
hooks.
86. PA. CONS. STAT. ANN §§ 501, 503 (Purdon 1983) are cited supra note 75. Section
18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 510 reads:
Conduct involving the appropriation, seizure or destruction of, damage to, intru-
sion on or interference with property is justifiable under circumstances which
would establish a defense of privilege in a civil action based thereon, unless:
(1) this title or the law defining the offense deals with the specific situation
involved; or(2) a legislative purpose to exclude the justification claimed otherwise plainly
appears.
Id.
87. Commonwealth v. Berrigan, 472 A.2d at 1107.
88. Id.
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ask, "What value higher than the value of literal compliance
with the law is defendant asserting?" The trial court failed to
ask this question . . . . But appellants . . . are pleading the
danger arising from nuclear missiles. One who does not under-
stand that danger does not understand appellants' plea .... No
peril is greater-no peril even approaches-the peril of nuclear
war .... It is in the light of this peril that the reasonableness of
appellants' belief must be judged.8'
3. People v. Lemnitzer 0
People v. Lemnitzer involved an attempt to save lives by
preventing further nuclear weapons proliferation, in which the de-
fendant was acquitted based on the Principle of Necessity. On Feb-
ruary 1, 1982, John Lemnitzer, a Lutheran minister, took part in a
blockade at Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL) in
an attempt to stop further development of nuclear weapons. LLNL
89. Id. at 1114-16 (Spaeth, J., concurring).
In overruling this decision, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court agaiin prejudged the issue:
"The mere manufacturing of [nuclear] bomb shell casings cannot be viewed as the type of
dangerous activity which could result in a public disaster .... " Commonwealth v. Berrigan,
J-156-7. The court ruled as a matter of law that the "process of manufacture is so removed
from the ultimate question of use as to be pure conjecture and speculation." Id. at J-156-8.
This type of reasoning has been rejected since the end of World War II. The mere manufac-
ture of nuclear bomb parts or the assembly of them is really the "planning and preparing" of a
war of aggression or war in violation of a treaty that is prohibited by the Nuremberg Princi-
ples as incorporated in United States law. 59 Stat. 1544, E.A.S. 472 (1945). See also Air Force
Pamphlet 110-31, Nov. 19, 1976 at 15-3. "[llnternational law creates rights and imposes obli-
gations" on both States and individual civilians under the laws of war; United States Dep't of
the Army Field Manual, FM 27-10, at 4 (1956) (as amended by change no. 1, 1976). The
"mere manufacture" of the gas that helped exterminate the democratic left and the Jews of
Europe did not excuse the criminal liability of the private manufacturers. Zyklon-B Case,
Military Tribunal VI, Trials of War Criminals Before the Nuremberg Military Tribunal
(1953).
The court erroneously concluded that manufacturing parts of weapons of mass destruction
is "legal conduct" and also that "the legislature has spoken in excluding the justification de-
fense" for their conduct, at J-156-6 n.5. The MODEL PENAL CODE grants supremacy to a
legislative choice, "so long as it acts within constitutional limits." MODEL PENAL CODE § 3.02,
comment, at 13 (1985). Treaty law and the law of the nations, i.e. customary international
law, represent constitutional limits on all three of the independent branches of government. All
weapon systems must "be consistent with the obligations assumed by the U.S. government
under all applicable treaties, with customary international law, and, in particular, with the
laws of war." Dep't of Defense Instruction, 5500.15, Oct. 18, 1974. The treaty laws of war
prohibit weapons of mass destruction, (see the Geneva protocols 36 Stat. 2259, 2277, 2295,
2310, 2351, 2371; 47 Stat. 2021, 2074; T.I.A.S. 3362, 3363, 3364, 3365; and the United
Nations Charter, 59 Stat. 1035), treaty and custom prohibit threats and plans of genocide. 78
U.N.T.S. 277.
90. No. 27106E (Pleasanton-Livermore Judicial District, Alameda Co. Muni. Ct.,
1982).
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is one of the two facilities in the United States where nuclear bombs
are designed. Lemnitzer was arrested and charged with willful and
malicious obstruction per section 647(c) of the California Penal
Code.91
At trial, Lemnitzer raised the necessity defense. He was allowed
to present evidence showing: 1) that he believed, at the time of his
act, that the development of offensive first strike weapons at LLNL
presented an imminent threat of overwhelming harm; 2) that his be-
lief was reasonable; 3) that lawful attempts at redress had proven
futile and left him with "no choice" but to act as he did; and 4) that
by obstructing entry into the Lab he had clearly chosen the lesser of
two evils. His first trial ended with a split jury, and at his retrial he
was acquitted.
4. State of Vermont v. Jeanne Keller"'
This case, more generally known as "Winoosky 44," stemmed
from citizen acts to prevent further United States supported atrocities
in Central America, as opposed to the prevention of nuclear ecocide.
However, the issues are similar because both involve saving lives and
the citizen's perceived right to intervene when the government is
committing grievous international crimes.
On Friday, March 23, 1984-the weekend of the fourth anni-
versary of the assassination of Archbishop Oscar Romero and only a
few days prior to a major debate in the Senate on Central American
policy, and after repeated unsuccessful attempts to convince Senator
Robert Stafford that he should hold a public meeting on the issue-a
hundred or more local citizens went to the Senator's Winoosky office.
They planned to ask him to withdraw support from the Administra-
tion's Central American policy, to vote against supplemental military
aid to El Salvador, and to hold a public meeting. These requests
were refused.
The group remained in the Senator's office over the weekend
conducting workshops which were attended by about 400 people. On
Monday morning the Senator's staff ordered everyone to leave. They
offered to do so if the Senator would hold a public meeting. This
offer was rejected and forty-four people stayed and were then
arrested.
91. CAL. PENAL CODE § 647(c) (West 1985) states: "Every person who willfully and
maliciously obstructs the free movement of any person on any street, sidewalk, or other place
open to the public is guilty of a misdemeanor."
92. No. 1372-4.84 CnCr (Chittenden Cir. Dist. Ct., Nov. 13-16, 1984).
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Several individual trials went on during the summer of 1984,
and the court refused to give jury instructions on a necessity defense.
Finally, late summer negotiations determined that the remaining
twenty-six defendants would be tried in a single trial if they were
allowed to assert a necessity defense. At this same time the periodic
rotation of District judges took place and Judge Frank Mahady was
assigned to the case by Superior Court Judge Tom Hayes. Judge
Hayes indicated that offensive judicial errors occurred in the earlier
trials which he did not want to see repeated. 93
Expert witnesses were called at trial. When the defense closed
its case, Judge Mahady, reputed to be the best constitutional jurist in
the state,94 instructed the jury that "[tihe defense of necessity is well
recognized in the law and was explicitly recognized as being the law
of the State of Vermont by our own Supreme Court within the past
year.""" He then charged the jury, in determining if defendants had
established the necessity of their acts, to consider:
[F]our well established analytical elements of that defense
...have been laid down by our State Supreme Court ....
The four elements which must prevail are as follows: First,
there must be a situation of emergency arising without fault on
the part of the .. .defendants. Secondly, this emergency must
be so imminent and compelling as to raise a reasonable expecta-
tion of harm either directly to the defendant or upon those he
was seeking to protect. Third, the emergency must present no
reasonable opportunity to avoid the injury without committing
the unlawful act .... And fourth, the injury impending from
the emergency must be of sufficient seriousness to outweigh the
criminal wrong that has been alleged ...."
The judge then instructed the jury minutely on each element. The
jury found all defendants not guilty.
Although it is beyond the scope of this article to delve into a
defense based on international law, it should be noted that such a
defense was allowed in this trial. To the authors' knowledge, this is
the first time an international law defense was allowed in a citizen
intervention case.
93. Letter from Melrose Huff, one of the defendants in this case, to Robert Aldridge
(Feb. 4, 1985).
94. Id.
95. State v. Keller, No. 1372-4-84 CnCr, Portion of Jury Charge in Trial by Jury, at
4-5. See also State v. Shotten, 458 A.2d 1105 (Vt. 1983) (listing the elements of a necessity
defense).
96. State v. Keller, No. 1372-4-84 CnCr at 4-6. See also id. at 6-9 (detailed jury in-
structions on how to weigh the elements of necessity).
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5. United States v. LaForge and Katt97
Recognition of the Principle of Necessity took place in a differ-
ent manner in United States v. LaForge and Katt. On August 10,
1984, John LaForge and Barbara Katt gained entry to the Sperry
Defense Systems Division plant near St. Paul, Minnesota and dam-
aged a Trident submarine guidance system. They were arrested and
charged with destroying property being manufactured for the United
States government under Title 18, U.S.C. section 1361. Maximum
sentence for the $36,000 damage was ten years in prison and a
$5,000 fine.
At trial defendants were allowed a necessity defense and the
court instructed the jury as follows:
During their case in chief, the defendants have been al-
lowed to attempt to assert a defense in this case which has been
variously referred to as the defense of necessity or justification.
The defense of necessity or justification requires evidence
of each and every one of the following essential elements:
(1) That the criminal conduct of which the defendants stand
accused was taken to prevent a greater harm to themselves or
others, which was imminent to occur;
(2) That there was no effective legal alternative method or
course of action available to them that could be taken to avert
this so-called harm; and,
(3) That there was a direct causal relationship between the
criminal conduct taken and the avoidance of the alleged harm.
It is not necessary that the steps be completely effective in order
to use this defense; in other words, it wouldn't be necessary that
they destroyed all nuclear weapons, but that they had an effect
upon them. 98
Defendants were found guilty by the jury. At sentencing the
judge made a lengthy statement, excerpts from which follow:
It is the allegation of these young people that they commit-
ted the acts here complained of as a desperate plea to the Amer-
ican people and its government to stop the military madness
which they sincerely believe will destroy us all, friend and en-
emy alike .... Can it be that those of us who build weapons to
kill are engaged in a more sanctified endeavor than those who
would counsel moderation and mediation as an alternative
method of settling international disputes?
97. No. CR 4-84-66 (U.S. Dist. Ct., Minn., Nov. 8, 1984).
98. Id. at Partial Transcript of Proceedings, Portion of the Court's Final Jury Instruc-
tions, Nov. 8, 1984.
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Why are we so fascinated by a power so great that we
cannot comprehend its magnitude? What is so sacred about a
bomb, so romantic about a missile? Why do we condemn and
hang individual killers, while extolling the virtues of warmon-
gers? What is the fatal fascination which attracts us to the
thought of mass destruction of our brethren in another country?
• . . have we given thought that, in executing that decree, we
will also die? .... [H]ave we so little faith in our system of
free enterprise, our capitalism and the fundamental concepts
that are taught us in our constitutions and in our several bibles
that we must, in order to protect ourselves from the spread of
foreign ideologies, be prepared to die at our own hands? . . . I
would here in this instance, attempt in my own small way to
take the sting out of the bomb, attempt in some way to force the
Government . . . to remove the halo - which it seems to hold
over any device which can kill - and, instead, to place thereon
a shroud, the shroud of death, destruction, mutilation, disease
and debilitation."
The judge sentenced each defendant to six months in jail and
then suspended that sentence on condition of six months probation.
6. People v. Boelcke 00
On November 3, 1983, the defendants were one affinity group
of a larger effort to blockade the gates of Williams International at
Walled Lake, Michigan, where cruise missile engines are manufac-
tured. They were arrested and charged with trespass and conspiracy
to commit trespass. At trial in January 1985, they were allowed to
assert a necessity defense. Instructions to the jury were:
To constitute the defense of duress or necessity, the defend-
ants must show:
First, the threat must have been sufficient to create in the
mind of reasonable persons the imminent fear of death or seri-
ous bodily harm to themselves or others.
Second, the threat must have in fact caused such fear of
death or serious bodily harm in the mind of the defendant.
Third, the fear or duress must have been operating upon
the mind of the defendant at the time of the alleged act.
Fourth, the defendant must have committed the act to
avoid the threatened harm.'"1
99. Id. at Transcript of Sentencing, Nov. 8, 1984.
100. No. 101194-101203 (52nd Jud. Dist., Jan. 7-12, 1985).
101. Id. at Defendant's Proposed Jury Instructions as given by the trial court.
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The trial court then instructed the jury on determining whether
duress is imminent.
(1) In determining whether the fear or duress was operating
upon the defendant at the time of the alleged act, you should
carefully consider all the surrounding circumstances as disclosed
by the evidence.
(2) Consider the nature of the threats or force, if you should
find such threats or force to have been made.
(3) Consider the situation of the defendant at the time he or she
committed the alleged act. Consider whether he or she had ei-
ther the opportunity or the ability to avoid the feared harm
without committing the alleged act. In this regard you should
also consider the reasonableness of any other course of action in
view of all the circumstances which were known to the defend-
ant at the time. 02
7. People v. Ann Jarka°8
For a week following the reelection of Ronald Reagan to the
presidency, a series of actions occurred at the Great Lakes Naval
Training Center in Illinois for the purpose of saving lives. The focus
was two-fold: to stop United States naval activities in Central
America and to stop the Navy's part in nuclear weapons prolifera-
tion, such as stationing nuclear submarines in the Caribbean and
supplying nuclear-capable artillery to the Central American region.
On November 13, 1984, as part of that action, twenty-two peo-
ple were arrested for blocking the entrance to the training center. All
of them were charged with mob action-a sort of misdemeanor con-
spiracy charge which involves knowingly assembling with one or
more people to break the law. About half were charged with re-
sisting arrest because they did not get up and walk when arrested.
Sixteen of those arrested went to trial but charges against eight
were subsequently dropped and a ninth was dismissed. The seven
remaining were allowed to present a defense based on the Principle
of Necessity. In ruling to allow such a defense, Associate Judge Al-
phonse Witt stated: "Let them have their day in court. The jury may
or may not buy the story.")1 0 4
After a one-week trial, the jury found the defendants were "not
102. Id.
103. Nos. 002170, 002196-212, 002214, 002236-002238 (Cir. Ct. of Lake Cty., Ill.,
April 1985).
104. The News Sun (Lake Co., Ill.) Jan. 29, 1985, at 1.
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guilty." Besides giving an instruction paralleling Illinois statutory
law, the judge also instructed the jury that to find the defendants
guilty of either mob action or resisting arrest, the prosecution must
prove they did not act out of necessity.
In addition, the judge gave the following instructions to the jury
regarding international law:
International law is binding on the United States of
America and on the State of Illinois.
The use or threat of use of nuclear weapons is a war crime
or an attempted war crime because such use would violate inter-
national law by causing unnecessary suffering, failure to distin-
guish between combatants and noncombatants and poisoning its
targets by radiation.105
These instructions are worthy of mention although international
law is not the subject of this article. To the knowledge of the au-
thors, this is the first time that a judge instructed a jury regarding
international law as it pertains to nuclear weapons.
8. Chicago v. Allen Streeter'"
In this Illinois case, citizen intervention was employed to stop
apartheid in South Africa. This issue too, has parallels with anti-
nuclear war actions and so is included here. The eight defendants
included clergy, organized labor, elected officials, community or-
ganizers, college students and a wide range of ethnic and religious
group members. On January 15 and February 7, 1985, defendants
went to the Chicago offices of the South African Consulate and re-
mained at the door until Consulate General Willie P.N. Lotz aban-
doned his long-standing refusal to discuss detentions, killings and
deprivation of human rights in South Africa. They were arrested on
charges of criminal trespass and brought to trial where they success-
fully raised a necessity defense to avoid the greater public harm of
apartheid. After two-and-one-half hours of deliberation, the jury
reached a "not guilty" verdict. This was reported as the nation's first
full trial arising from attempts to stop South African government
atrocities.
105. People v. Jarka, Nos. 002170, 002196-212, 002214, 002236-38 (Cir. Ct. of Lake
Cty., Iii., April 1985).
106. No. 85-108644, 85-108645, 85-108648, 85-108649, 85-108651, 85-108652, 85-
120323, 85-120326, and 85-120327 (Cir. Ct., Cook Cty., Ill., May 1985).
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V. ELEMENTS OF A NECESSITY DEFENSE WHEN CITIZENS
INTERVENE
The common law Principle of Necessity is becoming a more
accepted defense for citizen intervention to prevent nuclear war and
further nuclear weapons proliferation, as it is for avoiding the harm
from nuclear power plants. With that in mind, and in light of the
statutes and court cases described above, it seems that reasonable and
meaningful criteria for such a defense can be condensed to six
elements:
1) The defendant has a reasonable belief that a great harm is
occurring or about to occur;
2) The harm to be prevented is likely to occur so soon that citi-
zen intervention can reasonably be assumed necessary at the
present time;
3) The harm defendant is attempting to prevent is greater than
the injury resulting from defendant's intervention;
4) No reasonable traditional alternatives are available to stop or
prevent the harm, or a history of futile attempts to use accepted
means makes the results from those means, alone, illusory;
(5) The accused has a reasonable belief that a causal relation-
ship exists between the citizen intervention action and preven-
tion of the harm; and
(6) No evidence shows force or violence was used against other
persons by the citizen intervention act.
These six elements would put the most stringent test to any claim
that necessity justifies citizen intervention and would also raise ques-
tions of fact to guide the jury.
Applying the Principle of Necessity to citizen intervention ac-
tions attempting to prevent nuclear ecocide and genocide, and further
nuclear weapons proliferation, introduces new concepts of harm,
space and time. After helping to develop the atomic bomb, Albert
Einstein, one of the most brilliant minds of this country, described
perhaps the greatest danger of the nuclear age:
Our world faces a crisis as yet unperceived by those pos-
sessing the power to make great decisions for good and evil. The
unleashed power of the atom has changed everything save our
modes of thinking and thus we drift toward unparalleled catas-
trophe ... a new type of thinking is essential if mankind is to
survive and move toward higher levels.101
107. R. Lapp, The Einstein Letter That Started it All, N.Y. Times, August 2, 1964, §E
(Magazine), at 54.
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This new type of thinking is also critical in making judicial de-
cisions. The nature of harm and of imminence is one thing for a
person threatened with a fire, robbery or murder. But for the pre-
vention of nuclear war, the elements of necessity must be perceived
in a different dimension. The gravity of the harm-hundreds of mil-
lions of people killed and the rendering of this planet uninhabit-
able-must be realistically weighed against the means used to pre-
vent it. Under some modern circumstances a time urgency can be
measured in microseconds. In other areas, such as the 25,000-year
radioactive half-life of plutonium, we can see the other extreme. In
between is a wide spectrum of considerations. It is not possible to
depend solely on classical concepts which are no longer realistic or
meaningful. The following discusses each of the requisite elements.
1. The Defendant has a Reasonable Belief that a Great
Harm is Occurring or About to Occur
The question of fact raised here is whether the defendant's be-
lief that nuclear war will occur if corrective measures are not taken
is a reasonable belief. The mere existence of nuclear weapons and
their continued proliferation supports such a belief, inter alia,
because:
a) History reveals that virtually every weapon that has been
developed has been used for war.
b) History also teaches that peace is the exception and war is
the rule.1"8
c) Official statements by the United States Executive Branch
and the Pentagon clearly indicate that the United States is prepared
to use nuclear weapons, and indeed, to use them first.'0 9
108. See, e.g., Emerson, War Powers Legislation, 74 W. VA. L. REV. 53, 88-119 app.
(1972), which itemizes 192 United States military hostilities abroad through 1971 which oc-
curred without a declaration of war. See also J. NASH, DARKEST HOURS 771-776 (1977).
(lists wars from 1479 BC through 1973 AD).
109. On June 1975, President Gerald Ford was asked if the United States would use
tactical nuclear weapons if North Korea launched an attack across the 38th Parallel. He re-
plied: "We have a strong deterrent force, strategic and tactical, and of course those forces will
be used in a flexible way in our national interests." San Jose Mercury, June 26, 1975, at 24,
col. 8.
On July 1, 1975, Defense Secretary James Schlesinger said: "Under no circumstances
could we disavow the first use of nuclear weapons." San Jose Mercury, July 2, 1975, at 10,
col. 2.
On June 23, 1978, Defense Secretary Harold Brown said: "Nuclear weapons are not the
weapons of choice in Europe but they may have to be used if conventional weapons fail. We
have not renounced the first use under those circumstances." Watsonville Register Pajaronian,
June 23, 1978.
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In addition, the United States is developing certain so-called
first strike weapons which have a destabilizing effect.110 The distin-
guishing characteristic of these nuclear weapon systems is that they
will have the accuracy to destroy Soviet land-based strategic missiles
in their concrete and steel underground silos."' Although these
weapons are claimed necessary to destroy remaining Soviet weapons
during a United States retaliation to a first strike by the U.S.S.R.-a
policy called "second strike counterforce"-credible evidence from
official sources indicates that these weapons could actually aggravate
the Soviet first strike they are supposed to deter.
For example, the Congressional Budget Office said it would be
"virtually impossible" to deploy a force of precision missiles large
enough to provide significant retaliation after having absorbed a So-
viet first strike, yet small enough to avoid threatening Soviet inter-
continental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) with a United States first
strike. "2 It also warned of the dangerous potential:
Perhaps the most serious problem with U.S. forces
designed for second strike counterforce stems from the possibil-
ity that they would be seen as first strike weapons and thus be
destabilizing. Two types of nuclear stability might be threatened
by the development of a U.S. counterforce capability: crisis sta-
bility and arms control stability. The first kind involves the in-
centive to strike first that each side would face in an interna-
tional crisis . . . . Moreover, the Soviet Union, looking at
During 1978, President Jimmy Carter pledged: "The United States will not use nuclear
weapons against any non-nuclear state party to the NPT [Non-proliferation Treaty] . . . ex-
cept in the case of an attack on the United States, its territories or armed forces, or its allies by
such a state allied to a nuclear weapons state or associated with a nuclear weapons state in
carrying out or sustaining the attack." (emphasis added - note that the attack does not have
to be nuclear) Department of State Bulletin, Aug. 1978, at 52.
On April 6, 1982, Secretary of State Alexander Haig stated: "A 'no first use' policy
would be the end of flexible response and thus of the very credibility of the Western strategic
deterrent." U.S. DEPT. OF STATE, CURRENT POLICY No. 383, at 2.
In mid-1984, General Bernard Rogers, Supreme Allied Commander in Europe and Com-
mander-in-Chief of United States forces in Europe, said the first-use option is necessary to
maintain the deterrence. AVIATION WEEK & SPACE TECHNOLOGY, May 21, 1984, at 55.
For a history of occasions when first use of nuclear weapons was considered and for a
description of flexible response options, see R. ALDRIDGE, NUCLEAR STRATEGY AND THE
DEFENSE OF EUROPE (1984).
110. For a comprehensive discussion of first strike weapons, their history and their char-
acteristics, see R. ALDRIDGE, FIRST STRIKE: THE PENTAGON'S STRATEGY FOR NUCLEAR
WAR (1983).
111. The most obvious first strike nuclear weapons are the MX, Trident and Pershing-
2 ballistic missiles, nuclear cruise missiles and the bombers carrying cruise missiles.
112. CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE, PLANNING U.S. STRATEGIC NUCLEAR FORCES
FOR THE 1980s, June 1978, at xv and 40.
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capabilities rather than intentions, might see a U.S. first strike
capability in that light. Faced with a threat to their ICBM
force, Soviet leaders facing an international crisis might have an
incentive to use their missiles in a preemptive strike before they
could be destroyed by the United States."'
Another cogent warning appeared in the President's Arms Con-
trol Impact Statements (ACIS)." These statements cautioned that
the additive effects of these "potential advances in U.S. countersilo
capabilities by the early 1990s could put a large portion of the Soviet
fixed ICBM silos at risk.""' 5 They also warned that "under extreme
crisis conditions, Soviet leaders, concerned that war was imminent,
and fearing for the survivability of their ICBMs if the United States
struck first, nonetheless, might perceive pressures to strike first
themselves."' 6
The dangers just discussed are closely related to the escalation
from conventional to "limited" nuclear war, which will develop into
total nuclear annihilation. This three-step escalation is outlined in
the United States' "flexible response" doctrine for responding to a
massive conventional attack. Escalation to limited "first use" of thea-
ter nuclear weapons would happen in less than thirty days because
munitions and supplies would not last that long and the resupply
pipeline would be too slow." 7
The certainty of escalation from a limited to a total nuclear war
has been voiced by several high ranking military officials. Former
Defense Secretary Harold Brown does not see how "an initial use of
nuclear weapons-however selectively they might be targeted-could
be kept from escalating to a full-scale thermonuclear exchange.""' 8
113. CONGRESSIONAi. BUDGET OFFICE, COUNTERFORCE ISSUES FOR THE U.S. STRA-
TEG;IC NUCLEAR FORCES, Jan. 1978, at 32.
114. Pursuant to section 36 of the Arms Control and Disarmament Act, 22 U.S.C. §
2576, the President of the United States is required to submit Arms Control Impact State-
ments (ACIS) to Congress whenever he requests authorization or appropriation for military
programs. The intent of Congress is to obtain additional information from the Executive
Branch on possible impact of nuclear armament programs, major defense programs, and cer-
tain technology on arms control and disarmament negotiations and policy. The Arms Control
and Disarmament Agency is responsible for preparing ACIS.
115. Fiscal Year 1980 Arms Control Impact Statements, March 1979, at 55 (prepared
for the use of the Committee on Foreign Relations and Foreign Affairs of the Senate and
House of Representatives, respectively).
116. Fiscal Year 1979 Arms Control Impact Statements, June 1978, at 21.
117. For a discussion of Western European conventional weapons and NATO defense,
see, Economics, Politics Portend Shifts, AVIATION WEEK & SPACE TECH., May 21, 1984, at
50-63.
118. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE, ANNUAL REPORT FOR FISCAL YEAR 1979, Feb. 2,
1978, at 53.
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Former Joint Chiefs of Staff Chairman, General David C. Jones,
did not "see much chance of nuclear war being limited or pro-
tracted" and emphasized that there would be great difficulty in keep-
ing any kind of nuclear exchange between the United States and
U.S.S.R. from escalating." ' General Bernard Rogers, present Su-
preme allied Commander of Europe, declared that "we cannot con-
tain a nuclear war in Western Europe ... [it] is going to escalate to
the strategic nuclear exchange. It is just a question of how soon it
escalates. I happen to be one who believes, under present conditions,
that it is going to escalate very quickly."'"2 Even President Ronald
Reagan voiced skepticism, saying: "If war comes ... would the op-
ponent, faced with inevitable defeat, take that defeat without turning
to the ultimate weapon?"'
21
This sampling of official warnings-which does not even men-
tion critical analyses by experts or the dangers from false alerts, acci-
dents and terrorists-should compel the recognition that the harm of
nuclear war is a reasonable belief, and that corrective action by
many citizens is urgently needed.
2. The Harm to be Prevented is Likely to Occur so Soon that
Citizen Intervention Can Reasonably be Assumed Necessary at the
Present Time
The traditional concept of the common law Principle of Neces-
sity envisions emergency action to abate a here-and-now danger,
such as saving life or property from fire or preventing murder, rape
or robbery. Criminal law commentators LaFave and Scott speculate
as to the rationale behind this traditional concept.
It is sometimes said that the defense of necessity does not
apply except in an emergency-when the threatened harm is
immediate or the threatened disaster imminent. Perhaps this is
but a way of saying that, until the time comes when the
threatened harm is immediate, there are generally options open
to the defendant, to avoid the harm, other than the option of
disobeying the literal terms of the law.'"
In recent cases, however, it has become evident that the lesser
119. Washington Post, June 19, 1982, at 3.
120. Defense Department Authorization and Oversight, 1984: Hearings before the
House Armed Services Comm., March 10, 1983, Part 1, at 1300.
121. President's News Conference in Washington, D.C., Nov. 10, 1981; N.Y. Times,
Nov. i, 1981, at 24, col. 3.
122. LAFAVE & SCOTT, CRIMINAL LAW 388 (1972).
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evil (defendant's act of necessity) sometimes must occur well in ad-
vance of the greater harm. In People v. Harmon, the defendant es-
caped from prison one evening after threat of assault, but where no
present or impending assault existed. The Harmon court ruled that
"imminency is ... to be decided by the trier of fact taking into
consideration all the surrounding circumstances, including defend-
ant's opportunity and ability to avoid the feared harm."123
The courts recognized the need for longer term planning to pro-
tect our country, our planet, and our environment in Environmental
Defense Fund v. Environmental Protection Agency. 24 It was also
recognized that preventative action to avoid harm to those entities
also required more time-more than just hours or days. In like man-
ner, preventing nuclear war by preventing the development and de-
ployment of destabilizing weapons systems also requires a longer pe-
riod of time for three reasons: 1) it must deal with systemic forces
deeply-rooted in society; 2) the current policymakers of these institu-
tions, believing in the ethic that the best fighter survives,'25 will not
stop at present nuclear capabilities; and 3) the nature of the prevent-
ative action in this case is dictated by the harm.
In 1853, it was necessary to blast a firebreak well ahead of the
fire in order to save the unburned portion of San Francisco. Yet this
was a small conflagration compared to the incineration which will be
caused by a nuclear holocaust. The fact that nuclear annihilation
appears likely at some time in the future must be weighed against
the gravity of the harm when it does occur. It may indeed be the
tremendous gravity of nuclear war which makes it seem so remote;
the incomprehensible destruction seems unreal. This "psychic numb-
ing," as it is termed by psychologists, could account for the many
court rulings which term actions based on necessity to avoid nuclear
war as frivolous.
Any reasonable understanding of an impending harm must al-
low an interpretation that encourages prevention of a colossal harm
and that occurs at the climax of a long preparation process. In such
cases, preventative action must also be a long process which begins
early in the process leading to the harm.
The harmful process which results from destabilizing first strike
weapons can be identified as starting about 1966 when a strategic
exercise study was implemented to define the modernization of the
123. People v. Harmon, 220 N.W.2d at 214.
124. 465 F.2d 538 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
125. R. BARNET-r, RooTs OF WAR, ch. 3 (1972).
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United States strategic nuclear triad. The process was accelerated
during October 1981 when the Reagan Administration announced its
plans for "modernizing" the strategic nuclear forces.1"6 The harm is
expected to become critical as early as 1988 when sufficient numbers
of weapons will have been deployed to create the instability de-
scribed above.
Neither time nor opportunity will exist for reasonable interven-
tion, by citizens or any other means, at the time nuclear weapons are
to be launched. Therefore, the concept of a harm about to occur can
reasonably be held to include three essential requirements:
1) The feared harm is expected to happen so soon that prevent-
ative action must begin at once in order to be effective;
2) The harm is expected to occur far enough in the future that
there is still time to stop it by immediate and ensuing actions; and,
3) The ensuing actions need be continuous, with the immediate
action only in direction and intent, not necessarily in personnel.
3. The Harm Defendant is Attempting to Prevent is Greater
than the Injury Resulting from Defendant's Intervention
While "necessity is subjective as to its facts, it is objective as to
its values." 1 7 The objectification of these values is to be made in
accordance with ordinary standards of intelligence and morality. 2
Under any ordinary standard of intelligence and morality it is im-
possible to equate trespass, blockades, sit-ins, or even the symbolic
beating of weapons into plowshares with the harm of nuclear war
and annihilation.
Destruction of cities and towns, death and injury to hundreds of
millions of people, serious long-term birth defects, serious long-term
alteration of the ecological system, and widespread starvation due to
disruption of economic distribution systems are demonstrable
harms.1 9 The magnitude of nuclear war harm is succinctly de-
126. N.Y. Times, Oct. 3, 1981, at 12, col. 2.
127. See G. WILLIAMS, THE CRIMINAL LAW § 239 (2d ed. 1961).
128. N.Y. PENAL LAW § 35.05.2 (1968).
129. NATION PREPARATORY COMM., A CALL FROM HIBAKUSHA OF HIROSHIMA AND
NAGASAKI PROCEEDINGS: INTERNATIONAL SYMPOSIUM ON THE DANGER AND AFTER-EF-
FECTS OF THE ATOMIC BOMBING OF HIROSHIMA AND NAGASAKI, JAPAN (July 21-Aug. 9,
1977). DEFENSE CIVIL PREPAREDNESS AGENCY, HIGH RISK AREAS (April 1975); OFFICE OF
TECHNO.OGY ASSESSMENT, THE EFFECTS OF NUCLEAR WAR (1979); U.S. DEP'T. OF DE-
FENSE, THE EFFECTS OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS (April 1962); Proceedings of the First Congress
of International Physicians for the Prevention of Nuclear War, Airlie, Virginia (March 20-
25, 1981); Scientists Describe 'Nuclear Winter,' 222 ScI. 822 (1983); U.S. DEP'T OF DE-
FENSE, THE POTENTIAL EFFECTS OF NUCLEAR WAR ON THE CLIMATE (March 1985).
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scribed in United Nations General Assembly Resolution 1653:
The General Assembly . . . declares that:
a) The use of nuclear and thermonuclear weapons is contrary to
the spirit, letter and aims of the United Nations and, as such, a
direct violation of the Charter of the United Nations;
b) The use of nuclear weapons and thermonuclear weapons
would exceed even the scope of war and cause indiscriminate
suffering and destruction to mankind and civilization and, as
such, is contrary to the rules of international law and the rules
of humanity;
c) The use of nuclear and thermonuclear weapons is a war di-
rected not against an enemy or enemies alone but also against
mankind in general, since peoples of the world not involved in
such war will be subjected to all the evils generated by the use
of such weapons; and
d) Any state using nuclear or thermonuclear weapons is to be
considered as violating the Charter of the United Nations, as
acting contrary to the laws of humanity and as committing a
crime against humanity and civilization.18"
The gravity of the harm is an important fact when considering
the harm from nuclear war. In People v. Pena, the court held that
"it is plain that as the harm sought to be avoided decreases in seri-
ousness the duress [necessity] defense will excuse fewer and fewer
acts undertaken to avoid the harm." '181 It then follows that as the
harm increases in gravity, an act to prevent it becomes more reasona-
ble. It is in this light that actions intended to prevent nuclear annihi-
lation, no matter how futile they may seem, should be weighed by
the jury.
4. No Reasonable Traditional Alternatives Are Available to
Stop or Prevent the Harm, or A History of Futile Attempts to Use
Accepted Means Makes any Anticipated Results from such Means
Alone Illusory
In People v. Pena, the court held that "the more imminent the
peril, the less likely the existence of an alternative course of ac-
tion."'18 This hypothesis probably holds true in traditional cases of
necessity. But as Einstein so eloquently phrased it, the nuclear age
requires a new way of thinking.
A momentum exists in the nuclear arms race. A person running
130. G.A. REs. 1653 (Nov. 24, 1961).
131. 149 Cal. App. 3d Supp. 14, 26, 197 Cal. Rptr. 264 (1983).
132. Id.
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can stop within a few feet to avoid colliding with another. A heavy
truck however, cannot grind to a halt in time to avoid hitting a per-
son who leaps into its path six feet ahead. Nuclear weapons prolifer-
ation is a heavy truck rumbling along at high speed, and the drivers
are and have been intelligence and military personnel, along with
various elected representatives of the people. This momentum started
in 1945 when the United States began using nuclear weapons in its
military and foreign policy. After dropping two nuclear bombs on
large civilian cities, the United States thereafter initiated the policy
of threatening nuclear genocide on the Soviet Union. Since World
War II, the United States has considered or threatened to use nu-
clear weapons at least a dozen times,"'8 and its nuclear arsenal has
multiplied from one in 1945 to 30,000 forty years later. During that
time, the United States has designed 60,000 nuclear warheads of sev-
enty-one different types for use in 116 weapons systems. Citizen in-
tervention to stop the momentum before a catastrophe occurs is a
reasonable belief, and what alternatives are available to prevent this
colossal harm is a question of fact.
To give meaningful effect to the right to trial by jury requires
that the defendant be allowed to assert a defense." 4 But the necessity
defense to excuse citizen intervention to save lives is denied when the
judge becomes the fact-finder and determines that adequate alterna-
tives to such action exist. This is an example of a major failure of
the case law development of necessity in the nuclear age in which
judges "focus attention on the question of whether there were less
drastic courses of action that would have averted the harm" and their
proclivity "to find, after the fact, the existence of unrealistic or un-
reasonable alternatives. 1 85 These decisions never address the issue
of why, in a democracy, a jury of one's peers is not the proper body
to determine if reasonable alternatives exist. These courts have mis-
takenly converted issues of fact regarding availability of alternatives
133. Ellsberg, First Strike, You're Out, THE PROGRESSIVE, July 1985, at 32.
134. See Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 294 (1973) (due process "is in essence,
the right to a fair opportunity to defend against the State's accusations"); Bashor v. Risley, 730
F.2d 1228, 1240 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 137 (1984) ("the criminal defendant is
also entitled to adequate instructions on his or her theory of defense"); United States v. Kenny,
645 F.2d 1323, 1337 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 452 U.S. 920, cert. denied, 454 U.S. 828 (1981)
("When a defendant's jury instructions have been refused, the following principles apply. The
jury must be instructed as to the defense theory of the case, but the exact language proposed by
the defendant need not be used, and it is not error to refuse a proposed instruction so long as
the other instructions in their entirety cover that theory."); United States v. Kaplan, 554 F.2d
958, 968 (9th Cir. 1977).
135. Tiffany & Anderson, Legislating the Necessity Defense in Criminal Law, 52 DEN.
L.J. 839, 847 (1975).
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into issues of law, and thereby have destroyed the integrity of the
fact-finding process.
A recent example is In re Weller, 36 wherein the court held that
"the issue turns on the availability of lawful means for accomplish-
ing political change."1 8 7 In Weller, the two defendants and other
members of the Pacific Life Community were arrested for criminal
trespass at Lockheed, a major nuclear weapons proliferator, after
they had peacefully handed out leaflets to workers in an attempt to
persuade them to cease designing weapons of mass destruction-a
grievous harm-but refused to leave after 1.5 hours. The defendants
had a long history of using "lawful means" to stop the proliferation
momentum. One defendant had, among other lawful means, twice
run for Congress, worked to pass the Transfer Amendment, " ' and
also composed and performed songs regarding nuclear weapons
proliferation. At their day in court, the judge erred in refusing to
allow the jury to consider the defense of necessity. The defendants
should not have been required to convince the judge that they had
exhausted all alternatives. All that was required was for the defend-
ants to proffer sufficient evidence of the elements of necessity to raise
the factual issue so the jury could so find. " 9 When the court ruled as
a matter of law that the defendants had other adequate alternatives,
it was asserting that regardless of how diligent a party is in pursuing
alternatives, no matter how many years have been spent in legitimate
efforts to prevent the harm, no matter how much democratic mea-
sures are ineffective to handle the problem, the court in hindsight
can find just one more alternative, just one more letter to write to
their legislator, that a citizen could have tried before acting out of
necessity.
The court in Weller ruled that a free and democratic society
always provides its citizens with inexhaustible lawful means to not
only bring the United States into "[c]ompliance with international
law, '"'4 but also to determine national defense policy: "National de-
136. In re Weller, 164 Cal. App. 3d 44 (1985). There were two defendants in this case.
Defendant Weller has been sentenced, but defendant Goldsborough has chosen to pursue a
federal habeas corpus remedy.
137. Id. at 49.
138. The Transfer Amendment sought to transfer a portion of money allotted for nu-
clear weapons to the creation and production of peaceful alternatives to nuclear weapons
proliferation.
139. See United States v. Bailey 444 U.S. 394, 412, n.9 (1980); United States v. Peltier,
693 F.2d 96, 98 (9th Cir. 1982); United States v. Contento-Pachon, 723 F.2d 691, 694 (9th
Cir. 1984); Commonwealth v. O'Malley, 439 N.E.2d 832, 837 (Mass. App. 1982).
140. In re Weller, 164 Cal. App. 3d at 49. Apparently the court is unaware that in our
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fense policy is made through the political process, to which petition-
ers and most other citizens have free access." 141 Citizens who inter-
vene to stop the harm of the nuclear weapons momentum, however,
have reason to believe that the democratic process is not available to
them, and a jury could so find.
The Ninth Circuit in United States v. Contento-Pachon142 af-
firmed that the necessity defense was available to a defendant who
acts to promote the general welfare, and in United States v. Dor-
rell1 43 stated that the necessity defense recognizes "that, in certain
circumstances, the choice made by the defendant is a choice that soci-
ety would also have made and now is given the opportunity to rat-
ify." A jury of ordinary United States citizens could very well ratify
a defendant's conduct if allowed to consider the necessity defense. A
jury could be willing to make the same considered judgment as the
defendant-that after unsuccessfully utilizing the alternative of the
"political process" year after year, in order to stop the harm of nu-
clear weapons proliferation, a reasonable person in the United States
could conclude that the "political process alternative" is an empty
label and not a real alternative. The jury could very well perceive
that other action is necessary when trying to prevent the harm of our
annihilation.
Ruling as a matter of law that reasonable alternatives are avail-
able, and denying defendants their fundamental right to a jury trial
in which their peers decide fact questions, confirms that those whose
views conflict with governmental "policy" are excluded by the politi-
cal and judicial process. To accord citizens any less than a full hear-
ing before a jury when they are trying to avert nuclear ecocide, seri-
ously undermines our most basic rights by severing citizens from the
concepts of popular sovereignty that our Constitution was designed
to protect. It is hardly true as a matter of law that in 1986 the "po-
"free and democratic" society courts do not allow standing to individual citizens or to our
representatitives in Congress to seek United States government compliance with international
law. Courts typically dismiss the claim of the United States government committing interna-
tional law crimes because it is a "political question." See, e.g., Greenham Women Against
Cruise Missiles v. Ronald Reagan, 591 F. Supp. 1332 (S.D.N.Y. 1984); Sanchez-Espinoza v.
Reagan, 568 F. Supp. 596 (D.C. 1983); Pauling v. McElroy, 278 F.2d 252 (2d Cir. 1960).
But see Filartiga v. Pena-lrala, 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980) (torture is a violation of custom-
ary international law). A court will also dismiss a constitutional claim because it calls for an
"advisory opinion." See, e.g., Johnson v. Weinberger, discussed in San Jose Mercury News,
Nov. 20, 1985, at 14B.
141. In re Weller, 164 Cal. App. 3d 44, 49, 210 Cal. Rptr. 130 (1985).
142. 723 F.2d at 695.
143. 758 F.2d 427, 436 (9th Cir. 1985). The court, however, refused the defendant's
right to assert the defense.
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litical process" is a reasonable alternative and that twelve people on
a jury could not possibly differ as to that conclusion. As one com-
mentator observed: "Is there any reason why courts should be blind
to the social reality that confronts them and treat American democ-
racy as if it were still peopled by simple yeomen with equal financial
and political power?2 14
4
Even though American democracy was founded in 1776 upon
the principle that all political power is inherent in the people, and
that government derives its just powers from the consent of the gov-
erned, in 1986-in the nuclear age-these principles hardly conform
to reality. We live in a time and in a country in which the National
Security Agency, the nation's largest and most secretive intelligence
agency, is currently investigating whether at least one-third of all the
votes cast in the 1984 democratic elections were subject to computer
fraud.1 4 We live in a time in which "[t]hose who cannot afford to
advertise in newspapers or circulate elaborate pamphlets ' 1 46 do not
have real access to the "political process." We live in a time in which
private groups of wealthy people sell the Executive Branch's "Star
Wars" system to the American public on national television.1 47 We
live in a time in which military men are "being given the power to
control the information flowing into the nation's political debates," 148
and when industry, outside of the "political process," substantially
influences weapons policy, and a time when "many U.S. contractors
fear that weapons they have researched and developed for years will
become objects of superpower bartering before entering the lucrative
stages of full production.' 49 We live in a time when even if a small
group is able to collect a few thousand dollars, television time is de-
nied by local stations because the film the group hopes to show to
their fellow Americans says that the United States government's pol-
icies and money are responsible for atrocities in El Salvador and
Nicaragua.'"0 And we live in a time in which the "world political
process" cannot change United States nuclear policy. The United
States is one of the few countries declining to support successive
144. Devir, Towards A Political Theory of Public Interest Litigation, 54 N.C. L. REV.
1133, 1155 (1976).
145. N.Y. Times, Sept. 24, 1985 at 11.
146. Adderly v. Florida, 385 U.S. 39, 50-51 (1969) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
147. San Jose Mercury News, Nov. 14, 1985, at 17E.
148. San Jose Mercury News, Jan. 3, 1986, at 7B.
149. San Jose Mercury News, Nov. 22, 1985, at 7B.
150. "Faces of War" film produced by Neighbor to Neighbor, San Jose Mercury News,
Nov. 21, 1985, at 11C.
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worldwide resolutions calling for a comprehensive test ban.1"1
Assuming that other options are always open to people in a de-
mocracy assumes that the democracy is pure, which can only be true
in theory. A free flow of information rarely exists, and alternative
democratic processes do not always work.
The reality is not a system in which the citizen is master, but in
which he or she is all too often a victim. The citizen's voice on
policy questions is almost never heard. It is drowned out in elec-
tions by the multitude of issues that are presented in advertising
agency simplifications. It is ignored in the legislature where it
cannot compete against well organized and well financed lobby-
ing efforts of special interest groups."52
It is not rhetorical to say that citizens can become captive speci-
mens when secrecy and vested interests abound in government. In a
recent trespass case in which the CIA was recruiting at the Univer-
sity of Massachusetts in Amherst, Chief Judge A. J. Moore of the
Hampshire District Court made the following observation:
Today, we in this court have been reminded that even our own
government does not always act in conformity with the law, and
therefore, in such cases, I firmly believe that citizens have a
right to petition their government for a redress of grievances,
and to take reasonable actions so as to keep their government
within the bounds of constitutional authority and international
law. The system of American democracy depends upon an in-
formed public to which it can be held accountable. As defend-
ants have argued, I believe defendants have established their
right to have been on university premises for the purpose of
petitioning the CIA. This right derives not only from the First
Amendment, but also from international laws and treaties
which give citizens the right to hold their government to the
treaties of peace and friendship into which it has entered. Al-
though I reserve judgment in this case, international law may
even, as defendants have argued, impose an obligation upon citi-
zens to act when having such knowledge of law violations. Fi-
nally, this right stems from the Ninth and Tenth Amendments,
by which the United States citizens retain the inalienable right
to self-government. This right includes the right to have govern-
ment obey its own laws and the right to have the Executive
Branch give complete and accurate information to Congress and
151. Arbess & Epstein, Disarmament Role for the United Nations?, BULLETIN OF THE
ATOMIC SCIENTISTS 26, 27 (May 1985).
152. Denvir, supra note 144, at 1160.
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the People when asking for their consent to public policy; and
therefore, when it can be shown that our government refuses to
obey its own laws and when it misinforms the Congress and the
public, then citizens must retain that inalienable right to act in
a reasonable way so as to keep their government within the
bounds of the law. It is clear that defendants in this case held
such deep convictions that they could not stand by silently and
watch atrocious acts be funded and directed by the CIA, and a
misguided foreign policy in Central America. Defendants be-
lieve, as I do in this case, that all citizens must exercise and
protect those cherished rights by which they can call their gov-
ernment to account for its actions. Because in America our gov-
ernment derives its power from the governed, we Americans
must rekindle the spirit of civic duty, and when our government
refuses to obey the laws ordained by the People, we must exer-
cise those rights which the Constitution guarantees us, so as to
continue to strive toward a vibrant and effective democracy. "
Another cogent warning was sounded by the Senate Special
Committee on National Emergencies and Delegated Emergency
Powers:
Congress has not yet enacted laws which would prevent the Ex-
ecutive from using classification to withhold information from
Congress and the public. The problem of public accountability
can affect, in a very profound sense, the viability of Constitu-
tional Government. What the Executive does with public funds
and who is entitled to know about executive directives, are
among the most important questions now being asked of our
system of Government. Until Congress grapples with these is-
sues directly, it will be faced with a continuing wall of secrecy
and be unable to carry out its constitutional task of overseeing
the Executive. The Indochina war and "Watergate" tragically
illustrate the results of such congressional inattention.'"
It is to prevent this condition from maturing with regard to actual
use of nuclear weapons that citizens must actively participate in a
democracy. As the situation worsens, more severe citizen intervention
is called for to convey the seriousness of that situation to fellow citi-
zens. Citizen intervention is, in the final sense, a means of communi-
cation when other channels prove futile. But to assume that normal
153. Commonwealth of Massachusetts v. Perry Amsellem, No. 84-CR-3137 (Hamp-
shire Dist. Ct. of Mass. 1984).
154. SPECIAL COMM. ON NAT'L EMERGENCIES AND DELEGATED EMERGENCY POW-
ERS, U.S. SENATE, SUMMARY OF ExECUTIVE ORDERS IN TIMES OF WAR AND NATIONAL
EMERGENCY 9 (Aug. 1974).
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democratic channels always work and are inexhaustable is unreason-
able. In any event, it is for the jury to decide and not the judge
because "that is what trial by jury is all about: to ensure that the
defendant is not judged by a skeptical judge but by his peers." '155
A continuing global campaign to control or to abolish nuclear
weapons has existed since the advent of the nuclear age. 156 At the
same time, there has been an ongoing proliferation of nuclear weap-
ons systems in both quantity and sophistication. The strategic exer-
cise study initiated in 1966 started the process of conceptualizing,
developing, testing and deploying the destabilizing weapons which
are giving the United States a disarming and unanswerable first
strike capability. It was not until about 1970 that concerned people
in the military contracting industry started to recognize this trend,
and that the announced nuclear policy of the United States differed
from what was actually being pursued. 5
During the early 1970s, several major and complimentary cam-
paigns to stop new nuclear weapons were initiated. These involved
letter writing, lobbying, raising nuclear issues in political campaigns,
public education through all means of communication, public dem-
onstrations, picketing, civil lawsuits, and the like. Citizen interven-
tion has been interspersed with these actions. It has ranged from
mass non-cooperation to pay taxes which are used to build weapons,
to small actions employing symbolic means of communicating the
danger. But citizen intervention was employed only after "demo-
cratic" means proved ineffective on their own. Space prohibits
describing the overall global anti-nuclear campaign, or even all the
activity within the United States, but the anti-Trident element can
be used as a representative example.
Opposition to the threatened harm of the Trident missile and
submarine system first reached significant proportions in 1974 and
has grown steadily. In that year, a group of people formed the envi-
ronmentally oriented "Concerned About Trident" organization
which collected thousands of signatures opposing the new submarine
base at Bangor, Washington. Concerned About Trident filed civil
lawsuits against the Navy and Defense Department seeking to halt
plans for the base.1 5 8
Ongoing resistance to Trident continued with the formation of
155. Commonwealth v. Berrigan, 472 A.2d at 1155.
156. G.A. Rs. 1 (1946).
157. SOJOURNERs, Feb. 1977, at 29-31.
158. Concerned About Trident v. Schlesinger, 400 F. Supp. 454 (D.C. Cir. 1975); Con-
cerned About Trident v. Rumsfeld, 555 F.2d 817 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
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Pacific Life Community (PLC) in 1975 in the San Francisco Bay
Area and the Pacific Northwest. PLC worked closely with a national
network of anti-Trident organizations which were forming in the
eastern and Great Lakes states. This new movement first carried on
educational activities such as passing out leaflets, presenting slide
shows, organizing Trident Concern Weeks, writing articles and let-
ters, and testifying at hearings. Attempts were made to have Trident
contractors and the Navy participate in public forums to discuss the
new weapon.
When these "democratically" and legally acceptable means
failed to persuade Congress that Trident could not be developed, citi-
zen intervention actions began. They stimulated support from com-
munity and church groups to join the call for open public forums
and thus moved legal protest activities to a new plateau of involve-
ment. It may have been this potential for citizen intervention which
prompted authors LaFave and Scott to recognize that one may have
"not only a power to violate law but a duty to do so (much as a
trustee, in appropriate circumstances, has a duty, and not simply a
power, to deviate from the terms of the trust)." ''
Citizen intervention to save lives should not be viewed as a last
ditch stand to be employed only when all other means fail. On the
contrary, citizen intervention is an integral part of the overall cam-
paign. It is true that legal and popularly accepted means must first
be tried and shown to be futile on their own, but citizen intervention
does not replace those means. Preventing a harm as profound as nu-
clear ecocide and genocide requires every reasonable preventive ac-
tion available. Analysis of successful campaigns indicates that it is
the interaction of all activities which brings change.
What citizen intervention does is change the social climate to
one in which protected legal processes regain their meaning and ef-
fectiveness. Symbolic citizen intervention has stirred the conscious-
ness of people who work with nuclear weapons and has caused many
to resign."O It has raised the moral issues which have prompted reli-
gious leaders to include nuclear weapons education in their pastoral
duties. Citizen intervention has also created social awareness in pro-
fessional communities and has prompted these groups to instruct the
public from their area of expertise. A leapfrog effect occurs when
159. LaFave & Scott, supra note 122, at § 50.
160. See, e.g., GROUND ZERO (July-Aug. 1982) & (Oct.-Nov. 1982) (interviews with
and articles about several people who have resigned their work at the trident submarine base.
Also, one of the authors of this article resigned from designing Trident missile warheads six
months after witnessing a citizen intervention trial in Honolulu in 1972).
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citizen intervention restores the meaningfulness and effectiveness of
legal democratic channels.16' Although citizen intervention to save
lives may seem repulsive to some, it does create public awareness
which enhances the effectiveness of less offending means.
5. The Accused has a Reasonable Belief that a Causal Rela-
tionship Exists Between the Citizen Intervention Action and Preven-
tion of the Harm
To satisfy the requirement of a causal relationship when the
feared harm is the culmination of a long process ending well in the
future, the defendant's action must be within the context of the chain
of events directed toward the prevention of the harm. This require-
ment would appear to be satisfied if the citizen intervention action is
a vital, though a small part of the continuing process which shows
potential for stopping or preventing the threatening harm. In this
regard, the foregoing discussion about citizen intervention to enhance
the effectiveness of legal means is applicable.
The process which can be used in the case of preventing nuclear
war was used in the North American peace/environmental move-
ment. The potential of this movement is indicated by its past growth
and accomplishments:
1) Peace accomplishments since World War II include substan-
tial contributions toward bringing about:
a) A truce in Korea in the early 1950s in place of
efforts to conquer and occupy North Korea;
b) The failure of the United States Civil Defense Pro-
gram in the early 1960s to regiment people to accept nuclear war;
c) The 1963 Partial Test Ban Treaty outlawing all
nuclear weapons tests except underground;
d) Curtailing United States involvement in Vietnam
followed by eventual withdrawal;
e) Reversal of American support for Pakistan in sup-
pressing Bangladesh, accomplished through resistance and arms
blockades;
161. The legal and less questionable alternatives which must be shown as exhausted or
ineffective, in order to justify citizen intervention to prevent nuclear war, are generally actions
taken as part of an ongoing campaign over a long period of time. It is not reasonable that each
individual defendant actually participate in every alternative choice of action. For that reason
it is wise for the defense to request a jury instruction to the effect that, to justify necessity to
prevent the harm of nuclear war, it is sufficient that defendant had knowledge that all legal
and less offensive alternatives had been tried and found to be ineffective on their own.
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f) An end to the active Selective Service System with
amnesty for some draft resistors; and
g) A wave of state and local government resolutions
calling for a bilateral and verifiable freeze on developing and de-
ploying nuclear weapons."'
2) The growth of the movement is indicated by the following:
a) A dramatic increase in size and vigor of demonstra-
tions during the Vietnam War and recently against Central America
covert and military atrocities, nuclear power plants and nuclear
weapons;
b) An increase in conscientious objection to war from
1-in-3,000 draftees registered in World War II to 1-in-200 regis-
tered during the latter part of the Vietnam War to more than 1-in-5
who failed to register in 1982;18
c) An increase in the number of people who refused to
pay federal "war" tax on their telephone bills during the Vietnam
War from zero to 550,000;1 ' and
d) The concerted effort of many professional people
and religious leaders to achieve a higher degree of awareness regard-
ing social responsibility in their sphere of influence."'
Americans employing citizen intervention preventive actions
have foreign examples to assure them of a reasonable belief in the
162. By mid-1983, 11 state legislators, 56 county councils, 320 city councils, hundreds of
organizations, more than 200 U.S. Senators and Representatives, and thousands of prominent
citizens supported a bilateral and verifiable nuclear weapons freeze. A March 1983 Gallup
Poll indicated that 70% of the United States public favored such a freeze.
163. According to a 1982 General Accounting Office report, the rate of compliance with
Selective Service System registration laws is less than 80%. The number failing to comply is 20
times the entire federal prison population. San Jose Mercury News, July 28, 1982, at IA.
164. Associated Press News dispatch from Internal Revenue Service, published in THE
SEArTLE TIMES (1973) (cited in Defendants' Trial Brief, United States v. Kevin C. Patz, No.
77-196 M, United States Dist. Ct. West. Wash., Sept 12, 1977).
165. See, e.g., the Sixth Assembly of the World Council of Churches (July 24 - Aug.
10, 1983 in Vancouver, British Columbia, Canada) resolved: "[Tihe production and deploy-
ment of nuclear weapons as well as their use constitute a crime against humanity, and there-
fore there should be a complete halt in the production of nuclear weapons and in weapons
research and development in all nations."
See also Pastoral Letter from the American Catholic Bishops, The Challenge of Peace;
God's Promise and Our Response at 101-02 (May 3, 1983):
The whole world must summon the moral courage and technical means to say
'no' to nuclear conflict; 'no' to weapons of mass destruction; 'no' to an arms race
which robs the poor and the vulnerable; and 'no' to the moral danger of a nu-
clear age which places before humankind indefensible choices of constant terror
or surrender.
Id.
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nexus between their actions and the prevention of the harm. Their
campaign has been molded after several other successful nonviolent
social change movements abroad.
The Gandhian movement for India's self-rule started in 1919.
Mohandas K. Gandhi was probably the first to employ nonviolent
tactics on a large scale. His intention was not to punish or defeat the
opponent but to keep communication open in order to arrive at the
truth together. Violence was eschewed because that would close dia-
logue and obstruct the attainment of truth. The Gandhian campaign
was vindicated and steeled by the massacre of 1,200 Indians on April
18, 1919 and the jailing of countless others at other times. It waxed
hot in 1920-22 and again in 1930-34, and was completed in 1947
with the liberation of India-twenty-eight years after its start. 166
This philosophy and the tactics which flow from it can be seen in
many of the nonviolent campaigns of today.
Another example which supports a citizen's reasonable belief
occurred in 1956 when the United States Air Force decided to en-
large the Tachikawa Air Base near Tokyo. The first preventive ac-
tion occurred October 3 when several hundred peasants and support-
ers attempted to nonviolently block the entrance of government
survey teams. By October 15, several hundred citizens were occupy-
ing the land slated for expansion. The government eventually yielded
and the base was not enlarged.
Still another example comes from France, where peasants and
supporters in the Larzac region have continued to occupy lands
wanted by the French Army for use as a military base. The peasants
have been strictly nonviolent. They have mustered so much support
that the Army obtained less than ten percent of the land desired, and
even that land was reoccupied on several occasions. Not only did this
campaign delay the Army's plans, but the French government has
now officially abandoned enlargement of the base.
166. The Gandhian movement of Satyagraha ("Truth Force") had five successive
stages, each to be exhausted before the next commenced, in this order:
(a) Utilization of all regular constitutional machinery available;
(b) Agitation of the public through all types of expression;
(c) Ultimatum to the government, citing demands of the movement;
(d) Self purification to develop the spirit of harmlessness and remove any taint
of self-interest-through prayer, fasting and introspection;
(e) Direct action: boycotts, sit-ins, nonpayment of taxes, mass resignation from
public office, organized disobedience of certain laws. The training of Satyagrahis
was intended to be as rigorous as that of any soldier.
See generally M.K. GANDHI, AN AUTOBIOGRAPHY: THE STORY OF My EXPERIMENTS
WITH TRUTH (1957); M.K. GANDHI, NON-VIOLENT RESISTANCE (1966).
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Again in Europe, a nuclear power plant in Whyle, Germany
was partially occupied by mostly nonviolent means. Small numbers
of people were involved at first, but they later escalated to 25,000.
The government, though heavily committed to nuclear power, aban-
doned plans for construction at the site. The victory appears to have
inspired the many interventions which have occurred since in both
Europe and America. In the United States no new nuclear power
plants are planned and even those in construction are being can-
celled. 6 7 More recently, in the wake of a stiff resistance campaign,
the nuclear reactor at the University of California in Los Angeles
(UCLA) is being dismantled.
Americans can look to numerous examples in the United States
which support the reasonable belief of a causal connection between
citizen intervention and the prevention of harm. Nonviolent citizen
intervention has deep roots in American history. It was truly "civil
disobedience" at that time, and it was the primary tactic used in the
early stages of the American Revolution. The Boston Tea Party and
noncooperation with the Stamp Act are examples. The nonviolent
aspects of that revolution were so effective that some scholars con-
tend that with a little patience, the actual' war could have been
avoided. 6
Henry David Thoreau refused to pay taxes to support the
Mexican war and it was during his night in jail that he wrote his
Essay on Civil Disobedience which has become an American classic.
Gandhi gave Thoreau credit as a major source of his inspiration.
Another example from American history is the underground
railroad which was organized to take slaves to freedom-a highly
illegal activity at the time, but necessary for the participants. Nonvi-
olent direct action also played a key role in the Women's Suffrage
Movement. Alice Paul, leader of the Congressional Union for
Women's Suffrage, developed the tactics of the White House vigil
and the prisoner's hunger strike. Both were sustained over long peri-
ods and played important parts in gaining recognition of the
women's right to vote.
The sit-down strikes of the 1930s were also viewed as techni-
cally illegal, but they contributed to a change in history. They are
similar in several respects to the nonviolent occupations used against
the harm of nuclear power plants and nuclear weapons facilities.
167. NUCLEAR INFORMATION RESOURCE SERVICE, NUCLEAR ENERGY BASICS (in
1980, 16 reactor orders were cancelled nationwide and another were 70 delayed).
168. G. SHARP, THE POLITICS OF NONVIOLENT ACTION, PART ONE: POWER &
STRUGGI.E (1973).
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Both involve trespass on the property of the opponent. It is a nonvio-
lent tactic developed by the Women's Garment Workers during the
early part of this century and later adopted as a major tactic in the
1930s. These sit-ins won major strikes against Woolworth, Hormel
Packing Co., Good Year Tire, and General Motors.1 9
Citizen intervention was used in the civil rights campaign of the
1940s through the 1960s. 1"0 It started with the often illegal sit-ins,
freedom rides and boycotts. It was stiffened by the murder and jail-
ing of many participants. It achieved victories in the courts and in
Congress, but these victories had to be ensured with further nonvio-
lent direct action.171
Citizens who intervene to save lives have the reasonable belief
that the process by which grass roots movements bring substantial
change to government and against powerful interest groups requires
bringing the issues and facts again and again to public attention and
by ever-changing means. It requires arousing the public emotionally,
when those intervening actions are based on truth and the truth is
followed wherever it may lead.
Informed and encouraged by past history, the practitioners of
nonviolent campaigns, including citizen intervention to prevent nu-
clear war, cannot fail to see that the harm of nuclear weapons
proliferation can be stopped at some point. Continued escalation of
citizen intervention to save lives will heighten awareness of the dan-
ger and imminence of nuclear war and will stimulate support and
perhaps an obligation for resistance. Citizen intervention demon-
strates the degree of belief and personal commitment necessary to
change the public attitude that currently allows nuclear weapons to
proliferate.
6. No Evidence Shows Force or Violence was used Against
Other Persons by the Citizen Intervention Act
The final test in meeting the criteria of the Principle of Neces-
sity is how the action was conducted. Establishing in court that the
action was nonviolent to other persons is usually relatively simple. It
169. The sit-in at General Motors involved 200,000 workers who ignored court orders.
G.M. Production was cut from 53,000 vehicles per week to 1,500. After 44 days, GM recog-
nized the United Auto Workers, a major victory for the C.I.O.
170. See Bell v. Maryland, 378 U.S. 226 (1963); Peterson v. City of Greenville, 373
U.S. 244 (1962); Garner v. Louisiana, 368 U.S. 157 (1961).
171. Picket lines, marches, rallies, sit-ins, wade-ins, and other forms of citizen interven-
tion led to the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Nonviolent direct action and the bloody Selma
marches led to the Voting Rights Act of 1965.
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may help to identify some characteristics of a nonviolent action.
Most participants in citizen intervention to prevent nuclear eco-
cide are committed to nonviolence. They do not damage legitimate
property and they inflict no injuries upon others. Though they may
be treated violently, they do not respond with violence. Such nonvio-
lent actors are usually readily identified by police and security per-
sonnel prior to and during the action.
Some distinguishing features of a nonviolent campaign are: 1)
notification in advance to the authorities involved informing them of
the time and type of action, the general location, and the objective; 2)
advance publicity of the same nature to the media; and 3) intensive
training and other preparation by the campaigners for the action in
order for it to be totally nonviolent and based upon good will.' 7 ' The
motives and aims of such a nonviolent campaign are orderly educa-
tion, persuasion, and gentle conversion. The means used are not co-
ercive, but employed in an effort to win over opponents.
These six elements have been developed through decisional and
statutory law, and will provide fair, reasonable, and even rigid crite-
ria to guide the jury when an accused asserts a defense of necessity.
Again, in order to insure the constitutional right to a trial by a jury
of one's peers, the trier of fact must be instructed on these elements
when applicable.
The function of the jury must be scrupulously assured. The
jury's proper role in the criminal justice system was reaffirmed in
State v. Brechon.'7 8 In an action organized by the "Honeywell Pro-
ject" in Minneapolis, a large group of citizens entered the property
of the Honeywell Corporation at approximately seven a.m. on April
18, 1983 as employees were arriving at work. They occupied gate-
ways and doorways in an effort to obstruct entrances with the inten-
tion of preventing a grave harm by slowing production of nuclear
weapons components and cluster bombs. When asked to leave, 148
adults refused to do so and were arrested.
172. Training handbooks furnished to participants in many nonviolent citizen interven-
tion actions include the following to which participants subscribe:
(a) Our attitude will be one of openness, friendliness, and respect toward all
people we encounter.
(b) We will use no violence, verbal or physical, toward any person.
(c) We will not damage any property.
(d) We will not bring or use drugs or alcohol other than for medicinal purposes.
(e) We will not run.
(f) We will carry no weapons.
173. 352 N.W.2d 745 (Minn. 1984).
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Most of those arrested requested jury trials. Forty-six were
tried in Hennepin County Municipal Court on June 3, 1983 and
were acquitted. 74 They were allowed to testify and argued that their
conduct was justified because they were attempting, through their
opposition to Honeywell business policies and United States nuclear
policy, to prevent a greater harm from being committed; and that
their belief, good character, and the results they wished to achieve
gave them a right to trespass on Honeywell property. 175
The second group consisting of eleven defendants came to trial,
apparently planning to use the same defense, but the trial court re-
fused to allow the defendants to testify as to their intent and motiva-
tions in trying to prevent further nuclear weapons proliferation and
nuclear war. The Minnesota Supreme Court reversed because of this
error. "The question of sufficiency to raise a reasonable doubt is for
the jury to determine from all the evidence. 17' 6 The error was so
fundamental that the court in the concurring opinion warned: "The
strength of our democratic society lies in our adherence to constitu-
tional guarantees of the rights of people, including the right to a fair
trial and the right to give testimony on one's behalf. ' 177 These prin-
ciples were restated when the "Women's Peace Encampment" tres-
passed at Sperry-Univac, another nuclear arms proliferator in
Minnesota.17 1
The role of juries in a democracy is also respected by Califor-
nia's Chief Justice because juries
tend to temper the rigid procedural and substantive require-
ments of the law with the evolving customs, values, and common
sense of the lay community. Thus, our citizens are able to par-
ticipate directly in the constant reshaping and refinement of
both the laws and the attributes of their government. 179
Quoting Alexander Hamilton, the Chief Justice stated that the jury
is "a 'valuable safeguard of liberty' and 'the very palladium of free
government.' "'so
174. State of Minnesota v. Brechon & Carpenter et. al., No. 83094, at 2 (Fourth Judi-
cial Dist. Ct., Hennepin Co., Oct. 25, 1983).
175. Id.
176. State v. Brechon, 352 N.W. 2d at 750.
177. Id. at 752.
178. State v. Schervee, 356 N.W.2d 772 (Minn. App. 1984).
179. Bird, Jury Service, Legal Classroom at the Heart of the U.S. Justice System, THE
CHRISTrIAN SCIENCE MONITOR, Oct. 26, 1984, at B2.
180. Id.
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VI. CONCLUSION
The fundamental legal argument in citizen intervention to pre-
vent a grave harm is the protected right to present a necessity de-
fense to a jury. Numerous precedents exist to support that once the
defendant offers some evidence of necessity, the facts raised must be
presented to the jury to determine if necessity has, in fact, been es-
tablished. Nevertheless, jury instructions for a necessity defense have
been given in very few cases of citizen intervention to prevent griev-
ous harms. During the past decade, the common law Principle of
Necessity has gone through an evolutionary process, but the practice
of most courts, both state and federal, is still to rule as a matter of
law that defendants' offers of proof are either insufficient or frivo-
lous; this practice thereby denies the accused the right to present a
defense to the jury.
Courts seem to fear the consequences if the right to present a
defense is allowed when the relevant evidence relates to government
"policy." This evidence often reveals "central, physical, inescapably
painful reality beyond all rhetoric and beyond the improvised ambi-
guities of 'policy.' "181 The consequence of allowing juries to hear
evidence supporting the necessity defense has resulted in acquittals.
These acquittals have not gone unnoticed. The Reagan Administra-
tion's Justice Department is currently afraid to let juries hear sub-
stantive evidence regarding its nuclear "policy"-so afraid that when
a federal district judge is satisfied that the proffered evidence is suffi-
cient to establish a necessity defense for the jury to consider, the Jus-
tice Department petitions the Circuit for an extraordinary writ of
mandamus. In United States v. Fox & Manshardt,'8 2 the Justice
Department has asked the Ninth Circuit to order the trial judge to
not allow evidence of necessity, asserting this remedy is proper be-
cause the Justice Department lacks alternative means to prevent the
trial judge's abuse of descretion by allowing evidence of necessity. In
this instance it is the Justice Department that should resort to the
"political process alternative," rather than attempting to obstruct the
administration of justice. To assert as clearly erroneous the trial
judge's ruling to allow evidence of necessity is nothing more than an
attempt to suppress the right to be judged by one's peers. The evi-
dence of necessity has informed the public regarding government
"policy" and has perhaps encouraged informed dissent, which is a
181. Rosenthal, Poets Know Whereof They Speak, San Jose Mercury News, Jan. 5,
1986, at IP.
182. CR-85-152-TUC-RMB (filed Ariz. 1986).
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normal sequence of events when the free flow of accurate informa-
tion in a democratic society leads to correction of grave problems.
Trial judges typically avoid grave problems caused by the fed-
eral government, however, out of fear of appearing "political."
Judge Ulf Panzer of a District Court in Hamburg, West Germany
said about judges fearing to be political: "[L]et's not deceive our-
selves. Being silent is just as political a statement as it is to stand up
for the peace movement."' 8 Speaking on behalf of 800 West Ger-
man judges and prosecutors, Judge Panzer said: "German judges
were silent 50 years ago, when the Third Reich began to install its
regime of injustice, and later became a docile instrument of the Na-
zis and their immense crimes. Being silent today, we feel, would
make judges guilty once again."'' 8 He said he sees "a certain paral-
lel to the American judges. They have put up with the atrocities of
the Vietnam War in complete silence, as far as I know."' 8
Some judges look upon necessity as an elusive and mysterious
defense, not applicable to pragmatic affairs. In People v. Weber, the
court held "the exact confines of the necessity defense remain
clouded."'8 6 But that is not the case. The Principle of Necessity has
been developed extensively in this country and the requisite elements
have been expressed numerous times. The requisite elements of ne-
cessity to prevent nuclear ecocide and nuclear genocide proposed
above will give ample guidelines for jurors to weigh the factual is-
sues raised.
This comes back to the fundamental legal issue: "It is the crimi-
nal liability of appellants that is at issue, not the merits of our
nuclear policy. The jury need not agree with appellants' views in
order to acquit them. They need to find only that they acted reasona-
bly.' 8 7 The court added:
Instead, at least so far as I can tell from the record, their belief
was that their action, in combination with the actions of others,
might accelerate a political process ultimately leading to the
abandonment of nuclear missiles. And that belief, I submit,
should not be dismissed as "unreasonable as a matter of law." A
jury might-or might not-find it unreasonable as a matter of
183. Letter by District Court Judge Ulf Panzer, Hamburg, West Germany, Minneapo-
lis Star & Tribune, Jan. 11, 1985, at 1lA.
184. Id.
185. Public letter from District Court Judge UIf Panzer, Hamburg, West Germany, to
Judge Spaeth of the Superior Court of Pennsylvania (July 25, 1984).
186. People v. Weber, 162 Cal. App. 3d Supp. 1, 4, 208 Cal. Rptr. 719 (1984).
187. Commonwealth v. Berrigan, 472 A.2d at 1108 (emphasis added).
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fact. But that is for a jury to say, not the court.' 8
Reasonableness is an essential concept in the necessity principle.
Did the defendant reasonably believe a greater harm was about to
occur? Were there no reasonable alternatives? Was the action rea-
sonably thought necessary to prevent the harm? The greater the
harm, the more reasonable it is to do something about it, even if the
likelihood of success is small. As the Berrigan court said:
The fallacy in the trial court's and the dissent's reasoning is to
equate "reasonableness" with "success:" If by breaking the law
you did not succeed in gaining your objective, you may not
plead justification. But reasonableness is a function of the ac-
tor's situation. If the peril to the town was slight, it may indeed
have been unreasonable of me to make a firebreak by destroying
my neighbor's house. But if the peril was great, my action may
be seen in a very different light, and my plea of justification
may prevail, even in the face of proof that the fire swept across
.the space I had cleared, and burned down the town. 8
In a recent non-jury trial, the judge expressed similar views on
the "reasonableness" of actions when the judge acquitted defendants
of trespass at Williams International Corporation, a maker of cruise
missile engines.
The defendants simply came [to Williams] to protest and sur-
vive. They persuaded me their actions were motivated by fear of
nuclear weapons. I don't think that it is irrational to think that
by just standing in front of the gate you could prevent a nuclear
holocaust. It is all they can do. If people believe this is what it
takes, who can believe they are wrong. 9
In the case of citizen intervention involving politically sensitive
issues, it seems that the spirit of the law is frequently suppressed. It
often appears that skeptical judges interpret offers of proof establish-
ing the requisite elements in a necessity defense according to what
will be acceptable to the influential and powerful sector of society.
For that reason, it seems appropriate to conclude this discussion with
excerpts from the closing statement of Chad Myers, a not-so-power-
ful accused defending himself at a citizen intervention trial:
The defendants came prepared to give (a) testimony why
188. Id. at 1115 (emphasis in original).
189. Id.
190. People of the State of Michigan v. Lagrou, et. al., No. 85-000098 through 85-
000102 (52-1 Dist. for the County of Oakland, March 22, 1985), cited in Detroit News,
March 25, 1985, at 3.
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their actions are justifiable under the supreme law of this land,
(b) a justification defense-that is, breaking a lesser law to call
attention to a greater harm-and (c) testimony to our state-of-
mind at the time of our trespass.
Each of these defenses had been denied as irrelevant. Our
only recourse is to stress the true nature of our trespass-an act
of nonviolent, conscientious, law respecting, symbol employing
citizen intervention ....
The jury, the court, is witnessing a citizen intervention
case, perhaps the first for many of you. Citizen intervention, far
from being irrespective of the law, is by definition an appeal to
law; in its most profound sense, an appeal to law to question
itself. It attempts to demand a dialogue about the legal, lawful
and moral context of the law. What is tragically ironic is that
many judges have denied citizen intervention defendants that di-
alogue, under the pretext of legality, and then have in turn ad-
monished the defendants for their "lack of commitment to dem-
ocratic processes."
We are on trial today for an act of political and moral re-
sponsibility. At a time when there is a rapid disintegration of
personal responsibility we would seek to invoke a moral crisis.
Our purpose at Building 181 [at Lockheed], where Trident mis-
siles are being constructed, on Good Friday was to challenge the
legality and morality of the preparation to wage mass destruc-
tion. That was and remains today our purpose. Insofar as the
court will not recognize that purpose by at least hearing it, the
court is profoundly complicit with the widespread refusal to
take responsibility concerning the legitimacy of nuclear
weapons.
To consider the defendants' actions merely according to
narrow legal definitions is to trivialize these proceedings, to triv-
ialize Law and the true meaning of Rule by Law. We are ap-
pealing both to Law and Morality, both to conscience and re-
sponsible jurisprudence. We insist, precisely in choosing citizen
intervention as the vehicle for the demonstration of our concern,
that the Law be taken seriously; and morality, indeed the integ-
rity of international vows, be a function of that law. We refuse
to allow Truth and Common Good and Right and Law to be so
particularized that they are hopelessly segregated one from the
other. By intervening as citizens and coming to the court fully
prepared to explain and dialogue about that, we are upholding
the highest standards of an open society. Make no mistake, to
trivialize conscientious citizen intervention is to undermine the
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democratic ideal itself. We hope the court, the jury, the audi-
ence, and ourselves take that seriously. 191
191. People of the State of California v. Conk et al, No. 44880 through 44890 (Sunny-
vale-Cupertino Jud. Dist., Santa Clara Co. Muni. Ct., May 1-2, 1978).
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